Heinrich von Treitschke| Creating a German national mission by Kilgour, Johnathan Bruce
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
2004 
Heinrich von Treitschke| Creating a German national mission 
Johnathan Bruce Kilgour 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Kilgour, Johnathan Bruce, "Heinrich von Treitschke| Creating a German national mission" (2004). Graduate 
Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 2530. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/2530 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
Maureen and Mike 
MANSFIELD LIBRAJR.Y
The University of
Montana
Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, 
provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly 
cited in published works and reports.
**Please check "Yes" or "No" and provide signature**
Yes, I grant permission _
No, I do not grant permission _
Author's Signattre; 
Date: / 2 -  / ^
Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken 
only with the author's explicit consent.
8/98

HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE; 
CREATING A GERMAN NATIONAL MISSION
by
Johnathan Bruce Kilgour 
B.A. Colhy College, 2001 
presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
The University of Montana 
2004
Approved hy:
Chairperson
Dean, Graduate School
[ *2. -  13 - 04 -
Date
UMI Number: EP35706
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send  a complete manuscript 
and there are  missing pages, th ese  will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI
UMI EP35706
Published by ProQ uest LLC (2012). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQ uest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United S ta tes Code
ProQuest'
ProQ uest LLC.
789 East Eisenhow er Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 -1 3 4 6
Kilgour, Johnathan B., M.A. 2004 History
Heinrich von Treitschke: Creating a German National Mission 
Chairperson; Linda S. Frey,
A nation’s sense of its history greatly influenees the way that it perceives its role in the 
world. In nineteenth-century Europe, many national historians glorified their nations’ 
past, often portraying their fellow countrymen as a chosen people with a speeial mission. 
In Germany, one historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, had a great impact on the way that 
Germans envisioned their nation’s history and national mission.
At the time of his death in 1896, Treitschke held conservative political views and 
expressed strong enthusiasm for imperialistic and militaristic policies. Treitschke had not 
always entertained such right-wing opinions. As a youth he actually harbored liberal 
sympathies. Under the influence of thinkers like Hegel and Maehiavelli, however, 
Treitschke shifted from a liberal idealism to a narrowly defined realism. In the process 
he developed a eoherent vision of Germany’s national mission.
Treitschke presented his interpretation of German history in his university lectures and 
in his History o f Germany in the Nineteenth Century- He portrayed the German 
Reformation as a rebellion from the spiritual tyranny of Rome and as an act that made 
Germany a leader of humanity. This role as a crusader for intelleetual freedom eoupled 
with the strength of the Prussian state entitled Germany, so he argued, to a position of 
world hegemony.
Treitschke influenced many Germans, but perhaps none more so than General Friedrieh 
von Bemhardi. Writing after Treitschke’s death, Bemhardi appealed to aspects of 
Treitschke’s national mission to add authority to his own imperialistie and militaristic 
agenda.
Finally, this paper points out that Treitschke’s and Bemhardi’s theories reflected greater 
European trends of nationalism, imperialism, and militarism. Their work was not 
peculiarly German. They had eounterparts in most European countries.
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INTRODUCTION
NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL HISTORY 
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Following the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, British and American scholars 
issued a deluge of translations of works by a German historian named Heinrich von 
Treitschke. In 1915, Eden and Cedar Paul published the first volume of their translation 
of Treitschke’s History o f Germany in the Nineteenth Century, followed by volume two 
in 1916, volume three in 1917, volume four in 1918, and volumes five and six in 1919.
In 1916, Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille published their translation of Treitschke’s 
two-volume Politics. The titles of these works appeared harmless enough, but their 
translators and other commentators in Britain and America concluded that the ideas 
within them were threatening and offensive.
After examining the work of Treitschke, American and British scholars concluded 
that he was largely to blame not only for German imperialism and militarism, but also for 
the war itself. Charles Sarolea stated in his 1917 German Problems and Personalities 
that “more than any other thinker.. .Treitschke must be held responsible for the 
catastrophe” of World War I.' He pointed to the “enormous influence of Treitschke on 
his countrymen” and wrote, “Since 1914 he has become a household name and a name of 
evil import.”  ̂ In a 1914 book titled Why We Are At War, a group of Oxford professors 
offered more hostile criticisms of Treitschke, “whose lectures on Po/itzÆ have become a 
gospel.”  ̂ “The whole philosophy seems paganism,” wrote the professors, “or rather 
barbarism, with a moral veneer.”"̂
Joining Treitschke as a target for Western attacks was the German General 
Friedrich von Bemhardi, a man whose books on military theory had earned him wide
' Charles Sarolea, German Problems and Personalities (London; Chatta & Windus, 1917), 105.
 ̂Ibid., 103-104.
 ̂Members o f the Oxford Faculty o f Modem History, Why We Are At War: Great Britain’s Case (Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1914), 108.
“ ibid., 113.
professional acclaim, but who had also published several highly politicized works in the 
years prior to World War 1. As they did with Treitschke’s books, English-speaking 
bookstores stocked their shelves with translations of Bemhardi’s chief works. Editions of 
his books—with titles such as Germany and the Next War, Britain as Germany’s Vassal, 
and How Germany Makes War—became available in the United States and Britain in 
1914 and 1915.
Anglo-Saxon critics reacted to Bemhardi just as they did to Treitschke by 
damning him as a prophet of war. In a 1915 book entitled The War Lords, A.G. Gardiner 
called Bemhardi’s Germany and the Next War an example of “the strange mentality of 
Pmssia which has so baffled the world.”  ̂ Bemhardi was “the prophet of war.”  ̂ Gardiner 
explained that the Germans “have become obsessed by an idea, the idea of racial 
supremacy, of ‘Kultur’ imposed by the sword in the interests of the inferior types.”’ For 
Gardiner, who was blind to British efforts to take up the “white man’s burden,” Great 
Britain represented the defender of liberty and democracy. In contrast, the mentality of 
Germany “[was] all Force, Force, Force, soulless and cmel and barbaric.”*
While Germany’s enemies in the First World War certainly exaggerated the ideas 
of Treitschke and Bemhardi and used them as potent pieces of propaganda, their 
accusations were not wholly inaccurate, as these two writers certainly were at least in part 
responsible for the chauvinistic, imperialistic, and militaristic sentiments that permeated 
parts of German society before the Great War. While impossible to quantify,
Treitschke’s influence on the mind of Imperial Germany was undeniable. “It is scarcely
 ̂A.G. Gardiner, The War Lords (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1915), 250. 
® Ibid., 265.
’ Ibid., 252.
* Ibid., 263.
possible,” observes Paul Kennedy, “to go through the memoirs of the Wilhelmine Right 
without encountering some reference to the impact which Treitschke had made upon their 
formative thoughts.”  ̂ Among those who expressed their debt to Treitschke were men no 
less influential than Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow, as 
well as Bemhardi.
In the minds—or at least in the words—of Western propagandists, Treitschke and 
Bemhardi were not regarded simply as two men among many who had a hand in 
influencing a part of German society’s conceptions of itself and the world around it. 
According to Anglo-Saxon critics, these two men had single-handedly indoctrinated the 
German nation with their radical ideas. German pacifists, liberals, and others who 
reacted unfavorably to Treitschke and Bemhardi were entirely ignored as the West 
painted a picture of German society as a uniform product of Treitschke’s teachings.
Some Britons and Americans at least presented—and perhaps truly believed—that 
Germans were indeed “peculiar” in comparison with their Westem counterparts. The 
chauvinism and militarism present in Treitschke’s and Bemhardi’s publications were 
viewed as an aberration in Westem Civilization.
Of course, in its enthusiasm for militarism and imperialism the German nation 
was by no means unique in Europe. Nationalistic extremism like that of Treitschke’s and 
Bemhardi’s infected most, if not all, European nation-states. Britons gloried in their 
empire, upon which the sun never set. Pan-Slavism captured the attention of many 
Russians and Slavs in other Eastem European states. France witnessed the tirades of Paul 
Déroulède and the rise of a substantial revanchist faction within its govemment.
 ̂Paul Kennedy, The Rise o f  the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Ashfield Press, 1987), 
395.
In such a climate of national enthusiasm, historians were not immune from the 
popular mood. Nineteenth-century historians produced a high number of national 
histories, many of them epie in length and stylistically beautiful. While many of these 
historians portrayed their respective nations as specially unique, they shared several 
common methods and objectives. Each historian saw his own nation as a chosen people, 
as a culture somehow superior, either culturally, politically, or spiritually, to all others. 
Nationalist historians often interpreted their nations’ supposed peculiarities as 
justifications for various national missions. Finally, these historians all sought to glorify 
their nations’ pasts in an effort to rally popular support for national policies in the 
present, an exercise that often led them to portray falsely aspects of their nations’ past.
In France, Jules Michelet made no attempt to disguise his goal of writing a French 
national epic, at one point remarking that he envisioned his Histoire de la Révolution 
française, eompleted in 1853, as “an epic poem with the people as the hero.”*'̂  Michelet 
devoted much time to celebrating the aecomplishments of the French Revolution. One 
historian has written that Michelet regarded the Revolution as “an epic of liberty and a 
crusade for the emancipation of the people,”’* while another has described his work as a 
“hymn to the glories o f France as the principal actor in the drama of liberty.”’̂  Often 
noted for its stylistie brillianee, Michelet’s work assigned to France a glorious national 
mission as the deliverer of liberty to the oppressed peoples of the world. Voltaire and 
Rousseau appeared as “twin apostles of humanity,” and for Michelet the Revolution was
Jules Michelet quoted in Charles-Olivier Carbonell, “Jules Michelet,” in Lucian Boia (ed.), Great 
Historians o f  the Modern Age: An International Dictionary York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 252.
" Harry Elmer Barnes, A History o f  Historical Writing (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), 215. 
G.P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), 170.
by far the greatest historical event ever: “She came not as a nation hut as Justice, Eternal 
Reason, demanding nothing of men hut that they should realize their own highest 
aspirations.”^̂
In Britain, several historians also glorified aspects of their nation’s past.
Described hy one author as a “volcanic secular prophet,”*"* Thomas Carlyle set out in his 
1845 Oliver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches, with Elucidations “to vindicate both the 
character and the policy of his hero.” '^ In this four-volume work Carlyle presented 
Cromwell as a “Hero-Ring” who made great personal sacrifices for the good of his 
nation.*^ F.R. Floumey concludes that Carlyle succeeded in rectifying the then overly 
critical perception of Cromwell, hut in doing so he grossly overcompensated, sanctifying 
the man to an unbelievable degree:
The Cromwell o f Carlyle was always right in his policies. His brutalities were explained 
away or approved. Those who differed with him, whether Royalists, Fifth Monarchy 
Men, or simple Republicans, were subjected to vicious ridicule.'’
A disciple of Carlyle’s and “one of the most intensely nationalistic of English
historians,”** James Anthony Froude glorified British history after the style of his teacher
in his History o f England from the Fall ofWolsey to the defeat o f the Armada, completed
in 1870. The work had great “pictorial power” and “captivated the reading public,” *̂  but
was ultimately marred by its author’s strong Protestant bias. Froude portrayed the
English Reformation as a “[fight] for truth, honesty, and private judgment against
Michelet quoted in Gooch, 174.
Harold T. Parker, “Thomas Carlyle,” in Boia, 190.
Gooch, 306.
F.R. Fluomay, “Thomas Carlyle,” in Herman Ausubel, J. Bartlett Brebner and Erling M. Hunt (eds.), 
Some Modern Historians o f  Britain: Essays in Honor o f  R.L. Schuyler by Some o f  his Former Students 
(New York: The Dreyden Press, 1951), 39-40.
Ibid., 40.
Barnes, 219.
Parker, “James Anthony Froude,” in Boia, 198.
priestcraft and ecclesiastical tyranny.” '̂’ He presented Rome as “the enslaver of mind and 
soul.”^' For Froude, the English Reformation marked the beginning of England’s rise to 
national greatness. Ultimately, though, Froude failed to curb his own biases. Gooch 
concludes that his “lack of impartiality.. .excludes [him] from the first rank of 
historians.”^̂
Perhaps the best known of the British national historians was Thomas Babington 
Macauley, who was a formative influence on Treitschke. Known for his literary ability, 
Macauley once declared that “[t]o be a really great historian.. .was perhaps the rarest of 
intellectual distinctions.”^̂  In his extremely popular History o f England from the 
Accession o f James the Second, completed in 1855 in four volumes, Macauley portrayed 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as one of the greatest moments of history. Writing in 
the wake of the revolutions of 1848, Macauley saw the English Revolution as a model for 
all revolutions:
It was a revolution strictly defensive. In almost every word and act may be discerned a 
profound reverence for the past. O f all revolutions the least violent, it has been of all 
revolutions the most beneficent. Its highest eulogy is that it was our last revolution.^'*
The historian lauded the efforts of William III, portraying him as a man who sacrificed all
self-interest for the “interests of Protestant Europe.” Ultimately, Macauley’s History
was, in the words of Gooch, “a paean to the Revolution and to its principal author.”^̂
Enthusiasm for national history also found expression in Russia, where it was one
of the few types of literature permitted under the repressive censorship of the
^  Froude quoted in Lionel Milner Angus-Butterworth, Ten Master Historians (Freeport, NY ; Books for 
Libraries Press, 1961), 131.
Gooch, 311.
^  Ibid., 314.
Ibid., 111.
Macauley quoted in Gooch, 283.
Gooch, 88.
Romanovs?^ Russia’s first significant national historian, Nikolai Mikhailovich 
Karamzin, completed his twelve-volume History o f  the Russian State in 1824. Early in 
his life Karamzin had entertained liberal political inclinations, but as he aged his politics 
grew increasingly conservative and he developed strongly Slavophile and “conservative 
[nationalist]” views.^’ In his History “[H]e depict[ed] the early princes as absolute rulers, 
and present[ed] Ivan III, who freed Russia from the Tartars, as the ideal monarch.”
Gooch observes that Karamzin’s work “has been called the epic of despotism.” *̂ 
Throughout the work, the Russian historian argued “that autocracy alone had bestowed 
all the blessings that the Russian Empire had ever enjoyed.”^̂
Of course, enthusiasm for national history took hold in Germany as well. German 
historians, however, faced a dilemma that other European historians did not. As 
Germany did not exist as a national state until 1871, the Prussian school of German 
historians—Heinrich von Sybel, Johann Gustav Droysen, and Heinrich von Treitschke— 
wrote highly politicized accounts of the German past directed at harnessing national 
enthusiasm in support of German unification, which they all deeply desired. This trend 
was so apparent among these three historians that they are often referred to as the 
“political school,” an apt characterization considering these historians considered history 
to be a political device to affect policy in the present and future.
What these historians wanted to change was the political structure of Germany 
agreed upon by the delegates at the Congress of Vienna in 18I4-I815. Chiefly 
orchestrated by the Austrian foreign minister Klemens von Mettemich, the Congress
^ Barnes, 224.
A.V. Semenova, “Nikolai Mikhailovich Karamzin,” in Boia, 548; and Anatole G. Mazour, Modern
Russian Historiography (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1958), 62-66.
28 ,
29 1Gooch, 414.Mazour, 66.
pursued as a primary aim the restoration of the continental equilibrium to a semblance of 
its eighteenth-century balance of power. To recreate the pre-Revolutionary balance, 
Mettemich and his fellow delegates determined that Central Europe had to remain 
divided and established in the middle of Europe the German Confederation, or Bund, 
described by one historian as “a loose federation of thirty-five monarchical states and 
four city republics,” two of which were Austria and Pmssia.^*  ̂ The creation of the Bund 
in June of 1815 effectively left Central Europe in a state of political disunity.
Henry Kissinger has written that Mettemich’s primary concern “was the 
construction of the strong Central Europe which he considered the condition of European 
stability and Austrian s e c u r i t y . T o  maintain a stable Central Europe, Mettemich 
ensured a dominant position for Austria within the Bund. He could only do this, explains 
Kissinger,
by creating a political structure which would by its inner logic have to rely on Austrian 
support; by calling into being a multiplicity o f sovereignties which would have a joint 
interest with Austria in frustrating the twin movement o f nationalism and liberalism.^^
Kissinger identifies Mettemich’s two primary political goals as the paralysis of “the two
powers he considered revolutionary, Russia in Europe and Pmssia in G e r m a n y . T h e
Austrian statesman worked to thwart Pmssia’s potential as a nationalizing force in
Germany: “fear of the national mission of Pmssia became the unifying element within
the German Confederation under Austria’s tutelage.” "̂̂
By 1818 Mettemich had achieved his goal of a stable Central Europe dominated
^ Hajo Holbom, A History o f  Modern Germany vol. 2 1648-1840 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 
445.
Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Mettemich, Castlereagh, and the Problems o f  Peace, 1812-1822 
(New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), 232.
Ibid., 232.
”  Ibid., 233.
Ibid., 235.
politically by Austria. Nationalist and revolutionary sentiment did persist, though, as 
evidenced by Karl Sand’s murder of the journalist Kotzebue, suspected of spying for 
tsarist Russia, in 1818. This event gave the Austrian statesman a pretext for repressing 
civil liberties, such as freedom of the press, which European statesmen debated at 
Karlsbad in August of 1818. The resulting Karlsbad Decrees, “railroaded through the 
Frankfurt Diet” on September 20, 1819,^^ ineluded measures for censorship of the press 
and regulation of German universities, with the ultimate aim of “seperat[ing] Prussia 
from German nationalism” and “paralys[ing] the efforts of certain Prussian statesman.. .to 
ally Prussia with German liberalism.”^̂  Kissinger explains that the Karlsbad Decrees 
“ended, for the time being, the dream of a unified Germany.” ’̂
By 1848 the frustrations of German liberals living under Mettemich’s repression 
coalesced with social and political tensions triggered by the initial stages of European 
industrialization, creating a volatile situation in Germany that erupted in revolt in March 
of that year. The 1848ers primarily sought the creation of a German national state, seeing 
national unification as a vehicle for achieving desperately sought political freedoms. 
Deutschland iiber Allés, which was written in 1841 but would become the future national 
anthem of a united Germany, reflects several of the goals of the 1848 revolutionaries.
One line reads, “Let us strive fraternally for unity, law, and liberty with heart and 
hand.” *̂
In the Vormarz, the period leading up to the revolution, German liberals had 
begun to regard national unity and state power as perquisites for liberal political
Holbom, Modem Germany 2: 466.35
Kissinger, 241-243.
Ibid., 244.
Deutschland iiber Allés quoted in Holbom, A History o f  Modern Germany vol. 3 1840-1945 (New York; 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 41.
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demands. The first thinker to publicize such views was Paul Pfizer, a Swabian, who in 
1831-32 argued in his Correspondence Between Two Germans that a “constitutional 
system.. .could achieve its full liberalizing results only by turning a culturally united 
people into a political nation.”^̂  Pfizer added that any movement for liberal reforms and 
national unity would require a certain degree of power, which he believed could only 
come from the Prussian state. Pfizer was one of the first intellectuals to assign Prussia a 
nationalizing mission, but the desire for a Prussian-led unification of Germany soon 
became the dominant theme of many German liberals.
One German liberal who shared Pfizer’s conviction that only power could ensure 
national unity and liberal reforms was Friedrieh Christoph Dahlmann, who, severely 
disillusioned after the aborted 1848 revolution, proclaimed in the Frankfurt Assembly on 
January 22, 1849,
The path o f power is the only one that will satisfy and appease the fermenting impulse to 
freedom— for it is not solely freedom that the German is thinking of, it is rather power, 
which has hitherto been refused him, and after which he hankers.'*®
Dahlmann soon became the leading advocate of the Prussian-led unification of Germany.
The “spiritual father” of the Prussian school of German historians, Dahlmann instilled in
his students the belief that historical writing “must lead in the present, if possible with
stronger current than the Rhine.”'*̂ Droysen, Sybel, and Treitschke, following
Dahlmann’s teaching, all hoped to “prove” Prussia’s destiny as the national unifier of
Germany by finding evidence of a Prussian “mission” in the past.
Johann Gustav Droysen, bom in 1808 in Pomerania, held professorships at Kiel,
Holbom, Modern Germany 3: 42.
Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann quoted in Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine o f  Raison 
D ’État and its Place in M odem History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 395-396.
Heinrich von Treitschke, Preussische Jahrbiicher 1 (1861), quoted in Walter Bussmann, Treitschke: 
Sein Welt- und Geschichtsbild (Gottingen: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1952), 34.
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Jena, and Berlin. A liberal early in life, Droysen served in the Frankfiirt Assembly of 
1848 and was a member of the “moderate liberal ‘Casino’ group or 'Erbkaiserpartei,'’ the 
supporters of a hereditary emperor.”'*̂  Over time, however, Droysen shifted to the right 
politically, “finally even vindicat[ing] the starken Machtstaat, thus justifying 
imperialism, militarism, and the oppression of political opposition.”^̂  In the spirit of the 
Prussian school, Droysen dutifully espoused the conviction that Prussia’s historical 
mission was to unify all of Germany under the Hohenzollem crown. Two of his early 
works— Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen (1833) and Geschichte des Hellenismus 
(1843)—attempted to draw a parallel between Alexander and Macedonia on the one hand 
and the Hohenzollem monarchy and Prussia on the other. Droysen believed that 
Alexander’s conquest of Greece could serve as a model for Prussia’s unification of 
Germany/*'' In his “Memorial of a Schleswig-Holsteiner,” Droysen, the Pomeranian 
native, wrote that Prussia could not allow Austria to act as the strongest power in 
Germany.'*^
The second historian of the Pmssian school, Heinrich von Sybel, was bom in 
Düsseldorf in 1817 and held chairs at Borm, Marburg, and Munich, before he began 
overseeing the Pmssian archives in Berlin in 1875. In 1859 he founded the Historische 
Zeitschrift, which he edited until his death in 1895 and which has since become a major 
joumal of German historiography.'*^ Like Droysen, Sybel advocated a Pmssian-led 
unification of Germany, excluding Austria. In “The German Nation and the Empire”
Peter Schumann, “Johann Gustav Droysen,” in Walther Killy and Rudolf Vierhaus (eds.), Dictionary o f  
German Biography (DOB) (Munich: K.G. Saur, 2002), 688.
Horst Walter Blanke, “Johann Gustav Droysen,” in Boia, 276.
Blanke, 274.
Gooch, 127-129.
Hans Schleier, “Heinrich von Sybel,” in Boia, 317.
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Sybel called for the removal of Austria from German affairs, writing, “As sure as the 
stream flows forward, Germany will form a close union under the lead of its strong 
member.”"̂  ̂ Of course, he saw Prussia as the “strong member.” In 1894 Sybel finished 
his seven-volume Foundation o f the German Empire by William I, which one historian 
has called “a highly partisan defense of Bismarck’s politics and diplomacy,”"̂* and 
another “an apologetic vindication of Bismarck’s policies.”^̂
Perhaps more than the other members of the Prussian school, Treitschke, the 
youngest of the three historians, took Dahlmann’s words—history “must lead in the 
present” ®̂—to heart. Treitschke devoted his life and scholarly career, which are 
discussed in detail below, to the single goal of German national unity. His essays and 
lectures prior to 1871 vigorously advocated the need for a German state unified under the 
aegis of Prussia. Following unification, Treitschke modified his message slightly to 
account for the creation of the German Empire, but the same dominant themes remained 
until his death in 1896.
What Treitschke accomplished was nothing less than the creation of a coherent 
national ideology for the German people. In The Idea o f Nationalism,^^ Hans Kohn has 
provided a rich definition of nationalism and its necessary components, all of which 
Treitschke presented in his History o f  Germany in the Nineteenth Century and his 
Politics. Kohn argues that the ancient Hebrews were the first people to really develop a 
sense of nationhood and nationalism. Regarding themselves as a chosen people, they
Heinrich von Sybel quoted in Gooch, 131.47
^ Barnes, 211.
Schleier, 317.
Dahlmann quoted in Bussmann, 34.
Hans Kohn, The Idea o f  Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1944).
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shared a common history and a missionary or messianic zeal. In his main historical 
work, the German History, the first volume of which was published in 1879, Treitschke 
sought to give the German nation, which had only recently been united under one 
sovereign, a sense of a common national history, “the fundamental condition of national 
consciousness.”^̂
Treitschke also presented the German people as a chosen people. With Luther’s 
Reformation, the German nation became a “new Israel.” Other scholars have emphasized 
the importance of a sense of “chosenness” to any national consciousness and nationalism. 
In her work on British nationalism Linda Colley has argued that this sentiment was 
crucial to the genesis of British national consciousness. Eighteenth- and nineteenth- 
century Britons thought of their nation as a “Protestant Israel.
More than anything else, though, Treitschke established for Germany a sense of 
national mission, something that Hannah Arendt has called “the most dangerous concept 
of nationalism.” "̂̂ He commanded his fellow countrymen to devote their energies to 
bolstering the power of the German state and asserting themselves as a world power. He 
found justification for such a mission in the German past, particularly in the traditions of 
the Prussian state and the Hohenzollem dynasty. Through a policy of imperial 
expansion, perhaps violent in nature, Treitschke wanted Germany to rise to a hegemonic 
position not just in Europe, but also in the world, just as Pmssia had asserted itself as the 
hegemon in Germany. Treitschke’s message found a receptive audience in men like 
Friedrich von Bemhardi and other members of the radical right who could look to 
Treitschke to legitimize their own adventurous plans.
Ibid., 35.
Linda Colley, Forging the Nation, 7707-7537 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 369.
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CHAPTER ONE
TREITSCHKE’S LIFE AND INTELLECTUAL DEVELOMENT: 
IN SEARCH OF A NATIONAL MISSION
15
Treitschke, described by G.P. Goocb as “[t]be youngest, greatest and last of the 
Prussian School” and as the historian who “most completely embodies the blending of 
history and politics which it is the aim of the school to achieve,” was perhaps the greatest 
culprit in falsifying German history.^ Andreas Dorpalen has called Treitschke the “most 
vocal” representative of the Prussian school, an accurate qualification considering 
Treitsehke spent the majority of his career as a historian shrilly espousing the national 
mission of Prussia, and, once unification had been achieved, the national mission of 
Germany. In his efforts to holster claims of a German national mission, Treitschke 
revealed his chauvinistic enthusiasm for imperialistic and militaristic policies, as well as 
his exaggerated emphasis on the importance of the state.
The German historian had not always held such views, however, nor had he 
always been so sure of Prussia’s destiny as the defender of all “German” interests. In 
1848, while only fourteen years old and too young to take part in the revolution, 
Treitschke watched the events unfold in his home city of Dresden. An adolescent with 
liberal sympathies, he desperately hoped for the adoption of the proposed liberal 
constitution. After 1848, however, Treitschke’s political views changed greatly from his 
youthful liberal idealism. The formative intellectual influences of Treitschke’s life 
pushed him increasingly to the right of the political spectrum toward a narrowly 
nationalistic realism. As he evolved intellectually, Treitschke increasingly defined his 
political goals as national unification at any and all costs and, with ever growing 
intensity, he called on the Prussian state to complete this mission.
Bom into a military family, Heinrich von Treitschke was bom on September 15, 
1834 in Dresden in Saxony. Eduard von Treitschke, Heinrich’s father, made his living in 
' Gooch, 138.
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the military; he had beeome a lieutenant in the Saxon army fighting against Napoleon’s 
forces in the Wars of Liberation. Treitsehke’s grandfather had even served under George 
Washington in the American Revolution.^ By 1834, Eduard had risen to the rank of 
general. He had been bom a commoner, but was knighted by the Saxon king prior to 
Heinrich’s birth. An avowed Saxon, not a German nationalist, Eduard generally opposed 
efforts toward German unification, especially under the yoke of the hated Prassians. 
Eduard von Treitschke was also devoutly Protestant, an aspect of his character that would 
lead to many disputes with his son.^
As a child, Heinrich suffered from poor health and began to go deaf at an early 
age, an affliction that prevented him from following his father’s career in the military. 
Dorpalen has addressed the impact of Treitschke’s deafness—he was virtually completely 
deaf when he died in 1896—upon his political ideas. As he grew older and his affliction 
worsened, Treitschke lost the ability to comprehend completely reactions to his extreme 
statements. He was unable to truly see his “effect upon his audiences” and his deafiress 
“cut [him] off from exchanges of views. It would be impossible to quantify the impact 
Treitschke’s handicap made on his intellectual development, but there can be no doubt 
that Treitsehke’s deafness was a significant influence on the evolution of his political and 
social worldview, a factor that most historians have probably underestimated.
Treitsehke spent his youth in conservative Dresden. As the young Saxon 
developed political and social views independent of his family’s, his increasing liberalism 
and nationalism led to much feuding between Heinrich and his family, who remained
 ̂H.W.C. Davis, The Political Thought o f  Heinrich von Treitschke (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1915), 1.
 ̂Ibid., 2.
Andreas Dorpalen, “Heinrich von Treitschke,” Journal o f  Contemporary History 7: % (July-October 
1972): 30.
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defenders of the old order. Disputes between the younger and elder Treitschke became 
especially intense. In spite of the conservative and anti-Prussian sentiments of his 
family—or perhaps because of and in rebellion against them—Treitschke developed very 
independent political views. He once wrote,
I was brought up in the atmosphere o f  the Court o f Dresden, in circles whose political 
idea was hatred o f Prussia. If therefore I think highly o f  Prussia, this conviction is at 
least the fruit o f independent study. ̂
Ultimately, even Heinrich’s decision to pursue a career as a historian spawned the
ridicule of family members, who did not regard an academic career as a suitable endeavor
for nobility. Adolf Hausrath, a friend of Treitschke’s, wrote in his biography of the
historian that one of Heinrich’s relatives once suggested “the stable career” (taking care
of horses) as a suitable alternative to military service, a remark for which Heinrich never
forgave him.^
Treitschke was first exposed to liberal and nationalist ideas when he entered the 
public Holy Cross Gymnasium in 1846. “For the first time the boy learned something of 
the aspirations of the national and liberal movements,” explains Dorpalen. “His history 
teacher spoke to him about the power and glory of a united Germany. Other instructors 
aroused his interest in their efforts to obtain a liberalization of Saxony’s government.”^
As mentioned above, Treitschke was too young to participate in the revolutions of 1848, 
but the events did not go unnoticed. One of his gymnasium teachers was even active as a 
leader in the revolution.* As he watched the revolutionary activity Treitschke “was tom 
between his hope for an acceptance of the constitution and his hostility toward the
 ̂Heinrich von Treitschke, Briefe ii, no. 428, quoted in Davis, 1.
® Adolf Hausrath, Treitschke, His Doctrine o f  German Destiny and o f  International Relations, Together 
with a Study o f his Life and Work (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1914), 42.
Dorpalen, Treitschke, 5. 
' Davis, 2.
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elements which supported it.”  ̂ The Saxon King Frederick Augustus’s ultimate refusal 
to accept a constitution appalled Treitschke.
Eventually, the Saxon govemment had to request the aid of the Prussians to quell 
the revolt, an experience that helped convince Treitschke that German unification could 
only be brought about by a powerful Prussia. In a lecture delivered to his classmates at 
Holy Cross, he “vindicated the services of Prussia to the cause of German unity.”*̂ 
Dorpalen notes that the “vacillations of the Saxon king” during the revolutions aroused in 
Treitschke nothing but s c o r n . H e  was appalled by Saxony’s dependence on its stronger 
neighbor. A letter to his father reveals that even as a youth of fourteen, Treitschke had 
begun to develop a serious aversion to small states and their political impotence, a 
sentiment that would become one of the major themes of his mature thought. “Wretched, 
wretched,” he wrote, “is it to see how Saxony waits and waits till the decision comes, in 
order then to set her sails to the wind and humbly join the victorious side.”' ”*
In April of 1851, shortly after graduating from high school, Treitschke left his 
native Saxony to begin his university studies at Bonn,*^ where he was exposed to two 
great influences that helped confirm his conviction in Prussia’s national mission and also 
pushed his political views farther to the right. Perhaps most importantly, at Bonn 
Treitschke met Dahlmann, who supported the idea of a constitutional monarchy for 
Germany and political unification under Prussian leadership.*® In his study of
® Dorpalen, Treitschke, 8. 
Davis, 2.
Dorpalen, Treitschke, 9.11
Davis, 3.
Dorpalen, Treitschke, 8.
Treitschke, as quoted in J.W. Headlam, “Heinrich von Treitschke,” The English Historical Review  12: 48 
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Treitschke’s intellectual development, Walter Bussmann has written that Dahlmann made 
the greatest “human” impression on Treitschke/^ From Dahlmann Treitschke acquired a 
belief that “conviction” was a legitimate base for political and historical judgment. 
Dahlmann’s Politik, published in 1835, stated that political negotiation must derive from 
conviction, and that government officials should “not be the advocates of an assignment, 
they should be the representatives of a political conviction.” *̂ Moreover, Dahlmann 
instilled in Treitschke the belief that historical writing “must lead in the present, if 
possible with stronger current than our Rhine.”*̂
At Bonn Treitschke was certainly exposed to the Anglophilic views of Dahlmann. 
Charles McClelland has assigned Dahlmann to a group of German “constitutionalists,” 
who “looked upon England as an elder brother to be emulated or at least admired.”^̂  
These constitutionalists, who also included Friedrich Murhard and Karl von Rotteck, 
consistently expressed several common themes. First, they envisioned the British 
political system as the embodiment of Montesquieu’s Spirit o f  the Laws, with legislative," 
judicial, and executive branches of government all checking the power of the others. 
McClelland maintains that Dahlmann always held the false image of Britain as a “great, 
strong, balanced constitutional monarchy.” '̂ The second theme of this school of 
historians, and also a second misconception, saw the British monarchy as the ultimate 
power within the state. They failed to recognize the dominant position of the British 
Parliament, and envisioned “a strong king, of course, to guarantee social justice within
”  Bussmann, 33.
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the system.”^̂
Early in his academic career Treitschke shared Dahlmann's and the 
constitutionalists’ admiration of Great Britain and her political system. In 1852, while 
still at Bonn, the liberal Treitschke expressed great enthusiasm for the English 
constitution: “I derive great pleasure from it because it is a subject which necessarily 
awakens admiration and enthusiasm.”^̂  Macauley’s—“whose judgment was swift and 
simple”—and other Whig histories of England further aroused Treitschke’s admiration 
and contributed to his belief that “conviction” was a legitimate foundation for historical 
assessment.^"* Treitschke called Macauley’s History o f England a “splendid book, a 
magnificent conception of history.” He “could think for hours about a single phrase 
tossed out by Maeauley.”^̂  Six years later Treitschke still expressed high regard for 
English history. In 1858 he wrote, “Admiration is the first feeling which the study of 
English history calls forth in everyone.”^̂  Treitschke’s advocacy of the English model 
for the German constitution persisted for over a decade until the events of 1866 and 1870 
convinced him of what he perceived to be the inherent flaws of such a form of 
government.
The philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Hegel, whose thought helped solidify in 
Treitschke his conviction of a Prussian national mission and his enthusiasm for state 
power, represented the other significant influence upon Treitschke’s intellectual 
development at Bonn. Hans Kohn has argued that the thought of Treitsehke owed much
Ibid., 72-73.
^  Heinrich von Treitschke, Briefe, ed. Max Comicelius, 2d ed., 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1914-18) 1: 115, letter 
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to Hegel, who championed the notion of “history and the state as vehicles for the 
Divine.”^̂  Indeed, much of Treitsehke’s thought shared Hegel’s admiration of the state 
as a moral end. “The state is the true embodiment of mind and spirit,” Hegel once wrote, 
“and only as its member the individual shares in truth, real existence and ethical status.”^̂  
Kohn suggests that Hegel’s philosophy “diverted the German mind farther and farther 
from the liberalism of Western civilization.”^̂  In light of the work of the historians Geoff 
Eley and David Blackboum, who have successfully refuted notions that Germany’s 
political and social development represented some type of aberration in Western 
civilization, Kohn’s statement about the mind of Germany may be somewhat 
questionable.^® There can be no doubt, however, that under the influence of Hegel 
Treitsehke’s mind wandered farther and farther from the liberalism of its youth. The 
young historian began to view the state as the supreme end of society; it was the “Divine 
Will as it exists on Earth.” '̂
In his Machiavellism, Friedrich Meineeke analyzes the thought of Hegel, 
especially his conception of the state and its role. Like Treitschke after him, Hegel found 
much to praise in the writings of Machiavelli. He wrote that the Florentine statesman had 
“grasped with a cool circumspection the necessary idea that Italy should be saved by 
being combined into one state.”^̂  Hegel maintained the “necessity” of this idea, and 
Meineeke writes that Hegel fully excused Machiavelli’s methods, “pour[ing] scorn on the
Hans Kohn, Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1952), 112.
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trivialities of ordinary morality.”^̂  Hegel did not see the means advocated by 
Machiavelli as necessarily timeless, but he strongly supported the notion that the creation 
of a nation-state justified often immoral methods: “The only part that seemed to him 
valid for all time was the root-kemel of the doctrine, that the idea of a State, which ought 
to form one nation, should be brought to realization by means of all the methods 
necessary for that purpose.” "̂̂
Hegel linked state morality to the idea of personal duty:
The morality o f the State is not the moral, the reflective element, whereby personal 
conviction is the ruling element; the latter is more accessible to the modem world, 
whereas the true and ancient type has its roots in the principle that everyone has his 
duty/^
This assertion that the state itself possessed an inherent moral value took hold of 
Treitsehke perhaps more than any other theory to which he was exposed. He began to 
advocate state power and the enhancement of that power with increasing vehemence. 
Later in life he would write,
Hegel was the first to press into the sanctuary itself. He understood the state as the reality 
of the moral idea, as the national moral will, and with one blow overthrew all the 
doctrines o f natural law and political Romantik, which deduced the state from original 
contract or divine foundations. In this way the exaggerated idea o f the state o f  classical 
antiquity acquired new life, and to the state was assigned an omnipotence which does not 
belong to it, since the Christian world has recognized the rights o f conscience. But the 
deification o f the state did little harm among a people which had so long sought its ideal 
in a stateless freedom. Only by overvaluing the state could the Germans attain to a 
powerful feeling for the state.
In addition to giving the state innate moral value, Hegel had also assigned the 
state a civilizing and cultural mission. An important part of a state’s duty was to develop 
its citizenry intellectually and spiritually:
The supreme goal that a State can achieve, is that art and science should be developed in 
it, and a height attained which corresponds to the mind and spirit o f  the people. This is
Meineeke, 358.
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the highest purpose o f the State, but it is a purpose which the state must not attempt to 
produce as a construction; on the contrary, it must create itself out o f itself/^
Treitschke adopted a very similar eonception of the state’s role. He saw it as a civilizing
force, working to develop the nation morally, spiritually, and intellectually. Because he
held a very pessimistic view of human nature, Treitschke was convinced of the need for a
strong state that could function as a moralizing agent in society.
In 1852, Treitschke returned to his native Saxony to attend the university at
Leipzig, where he studied under the economist Wilhelm Roscher, whose influence
contributed to Treitschke’s increasing tendency to interpret political and economic events
in narrowly nationalistie terms. At Leipzig Treitschke attended a series of Roscher’s
lectures that were later published as Die Grundlagen der Nationaldkonomie, in which the
professor argued that just as different countries were better suited to different forms of
government, so were they better suited to different types of economic organization.
Universal, or natural, laws did not apply to economic relations in every country. Roscher
rejected the theories of the classical economists Smith and Ricardo, whose laws
supposedly governed all economic relations, everywhere.^* “There was no one perfect
economic system, he taught, no more than there was one perfect government,” explains
Dorpalen.*^ Dorpalen points out that Roscher remained very cautious in his scholarship,
“[deducing] his conclusions from careful, objective comparisons” and maintaining some
vestiges of universalism.
Treitschke, on the other hand, limited his comparisons to a select number o f living 
peoples, pointedly chosen fo r  his specific political purposes. In his thinking there was no 
longer room for those last vestiges o f a universal approach which still survived in the 
teachings o f  Dahlmann and Roscher.
Hegel, Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, quoted in Meineeke, 367. 
^ Dorpalen, Treitschke, 19; and Davis, 3.
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Aside from Roscher’s lectures, Treitschke found little that interested him in 
Leipzig. At Bonn he had formed many satisfying relationships with other like-minded 
students, but he thought the Leipzig students possessed a repulsive ‘“ crassly materialistic’ 
approach to their studies in which they saw mere gateways to profitable careers.”"̂* 
Treitschke did enjoy the company of several of Leipzig’s elite to whom his father 
introduced him. In this group of well-to-do professionals the young student was 
pleasantly surprised to find some men of similar political inclinations. The enjoyment he 
got from these associations was not enough, however, to allay his utter distaste for life in 
Leipzig. Frustrated with life there, Treitschke returned to Bonn in 1853, where he once 
again formed satisfying friendships with other students.'*^
After one term at Bonn, Treitschke transferred to Tübingen, to whieh he “took an 
instant dislike.”"'̂  Treitschke’s greatest complaint against the Tübingers was their 
stauneh south German particularism. “Particularism is in full bloom,” Treitschke once 
wrote, “few [of the students] have ever crossed the borders of black and red territory. We 
North Germans (all in all twenty) are quite isolated, for we are ‘heartless and superfieial,’ 
as the Swabian th in k s .D o rp a le n  writes that Treitschke simply could not understand 
the particularist mentality of the Swabians, nor did he ever make any effort to understand 
it, curtly dismissing it as “unnatural” and “corrupt.”'̂  ̂ After Tübingen, Treitsehke studied 
in Freiburg and then Heidelberg, where he finished his eareer as a student in March of
Ibid.
Ibid., 20-23.
Ibid., 25.
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1855/^
In his student days Treitschke had dabhled in poetry. In fact, before finally 
deciding to pursue a career as a historian, the young Saxon seriously considered devoting 
his life to poetry. In 1856 he even published a book of verses entitled Vaterlandische 
Gedichte (Patriotic Songs). As the title of the collection implies, Treitschke’s obsession 
with the political ideal of German unification infiltrated even his p o e try .T h e se  poems 
were no flowery verses about romantic love. Rather, like all of Treitschke’s other 
publications, they promoted the single goal of German national unification. He even 
opened the volume with an excerpt from Machiavelli’s Golden Donkey that urged the 
people around him to take action to achieve German unification instead of waiting idly 
for some divine miracle.'^^ In 1857 he published a second volume. Studies, which 
revealed an even harsher distaste for what he saw as political apathy and shallow 
materialism. He attacked the “selfish greed” of his generation, which was “[ejngaged in 
breathless, never ending deals” with hearts “as smooth as glass.”"*̂
After several months at home with his family in Dresden, Treitsehke traveled to 
Gottingen, where he spent the years 1855-1856 occupying himself with Machiavelli’s 
The Prince and Aristotle’s Politics, two works that would become major influences upon 
the German historian’s social and political w orldview .Treitschke was deeply indebted 
to Aristotle for molding his conception of the state. From the ancient Greek Treitschke 
adopted a belief in the state as the “core of all national life.” ’̂ Again revealing his highly
Dorpalen, Treitschke, 28.
Davis, 4.
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pessimistic view of human nature, Treitschke permitted the state
the right to be omnipotent over the individual because the individual could never develop 
or live a worthy life without the State’s protection and guidance; because the state was 
the supreme moralizing and humanizing agency in human life/^
The thought of Machiavelli made a powerful impact on Treitschke as well and 
had the effect of strengthening his enthusiasm for a strong state. In an 1856 letter to his 
father, Treitschke lauded the philosophy of the Florentine:
He sacrifices right and virtue to a great idea, the might and unity o f  his nation. This 
fundamental idea o f the book— the fiery patriotism and the conviction that even the most 
oppressive despotism must be welcomed if  it warrants the might and unity o f the 
fatherland— these are the ideas which reconcile me with the many objectionable and 
terrible opinions o f the great Florentine.
On another occasion Treitschke wrote of Machiavelli’s The Prince,
He is indeed a practical statesman, more fitted than any other to destroy the illusion that 
one can reform the world with cannon loaded only with ideas o f Right and Truth. But 
even the political science o f this much-decried champion o f brute force seems to me 
moral by comparison with the Prussia o f to-day [51c]. Machiavelli sacrifices Right and 
Virtue to a great idea, the might and unity o f his people; this one cannot say o f  the party 
which now rules in Prussia. This underlying thought o f the book, its glowing patriotism, 
and the conviction that the most oppressive despotism must be welcomed if  it ensures 
might and unity for his mother country—these are the ideas which have reconciled men 
to the numerous reprehensible and lawless theories o f the great Florentine. '̂*
Many of Treitschke’s later writings revealed his intellectual debt to the Italian statesman,
for this type of Machiavellian realism constituted a dominant aspect of his political
worldview.
In 1857 Treitschke defended his doctoral dissertation at Leipzig. In it he attacked 
a growing trend among German academics, namely the notion that state and society 
represented completely separate entities that acted independently of each other and thus 
should be studied independently of one another. Treitschke, by contrast, recognized a 
limited but necessary relationship between state and society. He argued that “[sjociety
Davis, 6.
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has unbounded claims upon the allegiance of the individual,” explains Davis, “but the 
State is only needed for definite and circumscribed objects, and has only to be obeyed in 
so far as the interests of society demand such obedience.”^̂  The successful dissertation 
revealed the influence of Roscher upon the young historian. Whereas Roscher had 
argued that every state had to have its own economic system, Treitschke suggested that 
“every nation must have its own peculiar form of State.”^̂
The favorable reception of Treitschke’s dissertation secured him a lecture post at 
Leipzig, where he earned the nickname “Apostle of Prussia.”^̂  It was at this point that 
Treitschke got the first impulse to write his German History. Originally, he only planned 
to write a history of the Germanic Confederation, based only on existing printed sources 
and intended as an “indictment” of the Bund, illuminating its political shortcomings.^* 
Before long, though, Treitschke had decided to expand his project in order to capture the 
complete essence of his nation’s past. “The kernel of the subject,” explained Treitsehke, 
“is not to be found in the Congresses and the negotiations of the Estates, but in the truly 
marvelous development of public opinion, or of the soul of the people or whatever else 
you like to call it.”^̂
In 1861 Treitschke published his important essay “Die Freiheit," essentially a 
review of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, in which he attacked the Briton’s utilitarianism 
and advocated the need for a strong state. Yet, as Davis has pointed out, although 
Treitschke rejected Mill’s particular brand of liberalism, he did maintain a lot of his 
liberal inclinations in this essay. “Everything new which the nineteenth century has
Davis, 6-7.
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created,” wrote Treitschke, “is the work of liberalism.” *̂̂ Davis observes that in 1861 
“political Liberalism meant first and foremost the idea of a united Germany.” '̂
Treitschke, who desired a national state that could protect liberal ideals, defined political 
liberty as “ruling and being ruled at the same time.”^̂  He envisioned a reciprocal 
relationship between the state and the citizen; the state’s “claim upon the loyalty of the 
citizens is to be absolute because its government is their govemment.”^̂
In 1863 the government of Baden appointed Treitsehke to the position of 
University Deputy Professor for Political Science in Freiburg, where he leetured on 
German history, the history of the Reformation, and other topics. '̂* Baden’s government 
was strongly pro-Prussian at the time and weleomed the arrival of the outspoken 
Prussophile. Some in the south German principality could barely believe that such a 
prominent figure would aceept a chair in such a politically unimportant place as Freiburg. 
“This is no place for a man like Treitschke,” wrote Karl Mathy, a high-ranking offieial in 
Baden’s government, in a letter to the prominent German dramatist Gustav Freytag. “But 
since he is interested, we are getting him of course with both hands.”^̂  Treitschke, whose 
reputation preeeded him, enjoyed great popularity as a lecturer at Freiburg.
While he enjoyed the admiration of his South German students, Treitschke did not 
reciproeate their warm sentiments. While lecturing in south Germany, he beeame quickly 
disillusioned by the South Germans’ lack of commitment to German unifieation, and 
developed in himself a strong distaste for what he called the “abominable South German
“  Treitschke, “D/e Freiheit,” quoted in Davis, 9. 
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particularism.”^̂  The South Germans’ strong regional loyalties and their evident 
Prussophobia led Treitschke to doubt the likelihood of the peaceful and voluntary 
unification of Germany. He concluded “that our fate will clearly be decided by 
conquest.”^̂
Political events of the mid-1860s accelerated Treitschke’s protraeted transition 
from the liberal idealism of his youth to the realism and narrow chauvinism of his later 
years and convineed him that his growing conservatism was the most effective and 
appropriate political stance for the time. Prussia’s wars against Denmark and Austria 
represented for Treitschke unquestionable proof of Prussia’s national mission. Her 
sweeping victory in the Franco-Prussian War and the consequent founding of the German 
Reich seemed to vindicate his spirited calls for a strong Prussian state. In response to the 
wars of unification Treitschke completely abandoned the liberal idealism of his youth and 
became one of Prussia’s and Bismarck’s most vocal defenders.
On January 21, 1864, Austrian and Prussian forces invaded Schleswig-Holstein to 
oppose the provinces’ official incorporation into the Danish state via the Danish 
constitution of 1863.^* The ensuing war against Denmark represented a major influence 
in this period of transition in Treitschke’s thought, as he expressed strongly pro-Prussian 
political views, calling for the Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein. The Vienna 
Peace agreement of October 30, 1864, represented for Treitschke a great step toward the 
goal of German unification, as it indeed was. In his excitement over this monumental 
event, Treitschke proclaimed, “The day will come, when both of the natural allies, the
“  Treitschke, as quoted in Hausrath, 10. 
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^  Holbom, Modern Germany 3: 169-170.
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Prussian state and the German Volk, will again find each other together.”^̂  The victory 
over the Danes aroused in Treitschke the belief that the occasion represented the 
“wonderful activity o f our history.” ®̂ He continued to call it—in a letter to his father, no 
less—“the greatest success that our foreign policy has achieved in fifty years.” '̂
The Prussian military victory and Bismarck’s skillful diplomatic maneuvering 
further confirmed Treitschke’s belief in the Prussian state’s German mission. Around 
this time Treitschke expressed in a private letter his conviction that unification could only 
occur under the Prussian crown, and only by war. The letter revealed a sincere 
commitment to German unification, as well as the historian’s intellectual abandonment of 
the liberalism of his youth and a movement toward the staunch monarchism of his later 
years:
There is only one salvation; a single state, a monarchical Germany under the dynasty of  
the Hohenzollem; expulsion o f the princely houses annexation to Prussia [sic]. That is, in 
clear and definite words, my programme. Who believes that this can be done peacefully?
But is not the unity o f Germany under the emperor William I an idea which outweighs 
100,000 lives? Compared with this idea my life is not worth a farthing.
During the debate over Sehleswig-Holstein, Treitschke softened his opposition to
Bismarck, to whom he had previously felt reluctant to give his full-fledged political
endorsement due to the chancellor’s repressive domestic policies. Evidently, some of
Treitsehke’s earlier liberal idealism still persisted. The Prussian victory over Denmark,
however, eonverted him to unwavering support of the Iron Chaneellor. “When.. .the war
of 1864 was over,” writes Headlam,
^ Treitschke, February 14, 1864, quoted in Ulrich Langer, Heinrich von Treitschke: politische Biographie 
eines deutschen Nationalisten (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1998), 104.
Treitschke, May 7, 1864, quoted in Langer, 104.
Treitschke, August 14, 1864, in Briefe 2: 339, quoted in Langer, 104.
Treitschke, quoted in Headlam, 733.
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[Treitschke] was first to applaud the policy o f the man who, having by the sword tom 
Schleswig-Holstein from the Danes, instead o f helping the re-estahlishment o f the state 
under its own dynasty, began the process o f  annexation/^
Many German liberals experienced a similar change of heart toward Bismarck. 
Dorpalen explains that the liberals “had for some time been suggesting that Bismarck 
might find absolution for his sins if they were committed to advance the cause of German 
u n i t y . T h e  rift in the party left the pro-annexationist camp of Altliberalen standing on 
one side of the debate and the “doetrinary-moral” Progressives on the other.^^ For those 
who continued to oppose Bismarck, Treitsehke offered the following condemnation:
“You want the unity of Germany, but you refuse to accept the only means hy which it can 
be brought about.”^̂
At this time, Treitsehke’s radical conservative views began attracting criticism 
from many anti-Bismarckian German liberals, as well as from his own family. The left 
liberal Jacob Venedey accused Treitsehke of shameful opportunism, charging that the 
historian hoped to gain a much desired appointment to the university at Kiel by 
advocating Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein.^^ Eduard von Treitsehke also 
expressed distress over his son’s evolving political beliefs and political life. In particular, 
the elder Treitsehke complained of his son’s loss of religious devotion and the growing 
“secularization” of his life and thought.^* In 1865, Treitschke’s father Eduard continued 
to express his displeasure with the intellectual and political course his son had taken, 
pinpointing the dominant—and indeed accurate—criticism many historians have since 
leveled against Treitsehke:
Headlam, 734.
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It hurts me deeply, that my son lets his inborn sense o f justice be entirely exhausted by 
his party fanaticism.. .it has damaged you greatly, that you have presented yourself not as 
a writer o f history, but rather as a man o f the party.’®
In an 1865 letter to his father Treitschke provided a rebuttal to such accusations, writing,
“That bloodless objectivity which does not say on which side is the narrator’s heart is the
exact opposite of the true historical sense. Judgment is free, even to the author.”^̂  This
statement revealed Treitschke’s commitment to being a “political” historian who could
use and manipulate historical truth to influence present political developments.
Following the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, Treitschke’s enthusiasm for the
Prussian state grew even more vehement. In an essay titled “The Solution of the
Schleswig-Holstein Question,” Treitschke expressed his strengthening “unitarianism,” a
term that Treitschke used to qualify the high degree of political unity that he desired, in a
phrase that seemed to sum up the entirety of his political thought: “We sacrifice to the
unity of Germany every other political good.”*̂
Treitschke’s most acute articulation of this conception of the state appeared in his
1865 essay Bundestaat und Einheitstaat (Federal State and Unitary State), in which he
wrote, “In the first place, the second place and in the third place, the essence of the State
is power.”*̂  Of course, the German liberals of 1848, such as Dahlmann, had come to
perceive power as a precursor to, and vehicle for, their liberal aspirations. But they had
seen power as a means to an end, a necessary evil to achieve future good,*^ whereas
Treitschke increasingly demanded state power as a moral end in itself. Meineeke
explains that power is indeed a necessary component of any state, but the essence of a
Eduard von Treitschke, 5/5/1865, quoted in Langer, 111.79
Treitschke, quoted in Gooch, 141.
Treitshcke, “Die Losung der schleswig-holsteinischen Frage,” Preussische Jahrbiicher 16 (1865), quoted 
in Langer, 109.
Treitschke, Bundestaat und Einheitstaat, quoted in Meineeke, 399.
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State comprises other qualities such as justice and morality to form a whole “essence.” 
“But Treitschke,” he writes,
repeatedly continued to announce that the essence o f the State was nothing else but 
power, thereby limiting it and corrupting those countless people who in life’s struggles 
hanker after simple pithy maxims, and causing them to overestimate and revere simple 
power, and thus see the basic problem o f the state in much cruder terms.
By the mid 1860s Treitschke had made a name for himself as a publicist,
attracting wide readership. His popularity and influence upon the German public are
indicated by an offer from the Prussian minister president in 1866 to employ Treitschke
in the service of the Prussian state. On the eve of the Seven Weeks’ War, Bismarck
requested the services of Treitsehke as a publicist in an attempt to gamer popular support
for the government, telling the historian that he knew and sensed the “deep currents of the
German spirit.”*̂  He even promised the historian access to the Pmssian archives, whieh
must have been an almost irresistible offer. Treitschke declined, however, citing his
opposition to Bismarck’s conservative domestic policies. Apparently, some of
Treitsehke’s earlier liberal convictions still lingered.
If Treitschke still harbored any ambivalence regarding the idea of the state in
1866, then Prassia’s crushing victory over Austria in the Seven Weeks’ War and the
founding of the North German Confederation certainly solidified the historian’s thought.
Meineeke argues that the events of 1866 marked a cmeial point in the growth of
Treitschke’s philosophy, “fixing his ideas on the State, whieh had hitherto been in
flux.”*̂  Langer notes that Treitschke clearly defected from the camp of idealism to
realism during the Prussian war against Austria in 1866. Following Prussia’s resounding
Meineeke, 398-99.
Bismarck’s letter to Treitschke, 6/11/1866, quoted in Langer, 118. 
Meineeke, 398.
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victory over the Austrians at Koniggratz, Treitschke credited the Prussian monarchy with 
the great success. In “Der Krieg und die Bundesreform” he wrote,
Today history put an end to doctrinary disputes over power and freedom with one blow 
It asks little about our theories, it crushes the fool who imagines he masters destiny with 
his wishes. The struggle about power dawns, and it would be the pinnacle o f foolishness 
if  we now rejected the parliament we have longed for, because the single hand that is 
strong enough to actualize it, the Prussian crown, offers it to us.**
In July of 1866 he expressed in a letter to his then fiancé, Emma Bodman, his optimism
that a German state united by the Prussian sword was all but inevitable; “A great piece of
bloody work still lies before us, but I have no more doubts about the final outcome.”*̂
In 1866, with Prussia’s victory over Austria, Treitschke fully pledged his
allegiance to Bismarck and abandoned his concerns of a proper liberal constitution in
Prussia, putting his full support behind the Iron Chancellor. Even his fiiend Gustav
Freytag referred to the professor as ‘'Bismdrckchen.”̂  ̂ “Always mindful of the primacy
of the state,” writes Dorpalen,
he opposed the inclusion o f a Bill o f  Rights in the constitution o f the new Prussian-led 
North German Confederation, objected to the introduction o f universal manhood 
suffrage, and regretted that the Confederation turned out to be less Unitarian than he had 
hoped.^'
In addition, Treitschke appealed to the Prussians to annex Saxony, Hanover, and several 
of the small German states. These demands of Treitschke signaled a clear and 
incontrovertible farewell to his earlier liberal sentiments, as state power and political 
unity became the only worthwhile political goals that he could possibly imagine.
This type of realism characterized Treitschke’s thought until the founding of the 
Reich in 1871. Langer writes, “The establishment of German unity now justly
Langer, 127.
** Treitschke, “Der Krieg und die Bundesformen,” quoted in Langer, 116-117.
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subordinated all other political o b jec tiv es.T re itsch k e  was not alone in this conviction. 
James Sheehan observes that a host of German liberals, among them Heinrich von Sybel 
and Hermann Baumgarten, shared Treitschke’s sentiments. This right-wing faction of the 
liberal party’s support for Bismarck was not a sudden rift with its prior position, but 
rather the end of a period of transition in their political thought. “[M]ost champions of 
Bismarck in the late sixties,” writes Sheehan, “had been persistent exponents of a ‘new 
realism’ and had often expressed their willingness to aceept national unity from any 
source.”^̂
Other German intellectuals at that time shared Treitsehke’s sentiment that power 
should trump all other ideals. Gordon Craig writes that “the bulk of the liberal party now 
gave up the attempt to reconcile the demands of freedom and the requirements of 
power.” "̂* He cites Karl Twesten, a moderate, whose comment on the issue sounds as if  it 
had come straight from Treitsehke’s lips: “No one may be criticized for giving 
precedence to the issue of power at this time and maintaining that the issues of freedom 
can wait, provided that nothing happens that can permanently prejudice them.”^̂  
Bismarck’s victory was consolidated with the passing of the Indemnity Bill that absolved 
him of past constitutional violations, whieh had been a sore point for many German 
liberals, and established him as a hero in the eyes of those same liberals. Wilhelm 
Liebkneeht caustically commented, “the angel of darkness has become the angel of light, 
before whom the people lie in dust and adore.”^̂
^  Langer, 119-
James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
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With his now unconditional acceptance of the Prussian state, Treitschke also 
began heralding the benefits of a strong monarchical government, in the process 
revealing the genesis of his later Anglophobia. Treitschke’s advocacy of a strong 
monarchy as a complementary aspect of his German mission grew ever stronger, as the 
house of Hohenzollem became for Treitschke what the house of Medici had been for 
Machiavelli. The maxim “/e roi règne mais il ne gouverne pas” struck Treitschke as 
wholly unacceptable;^^ he had now deserted his earlier liberal principles and placed his 
full allegiance behind the monarchy. Langer writes that for Treitsehke a strong monarchy 
presented a guarantee against a potential “tyranny of the majority” and encroaching 
socialism.^* Treitschke argued that “because our society is more demoeratic than the 
English, that’s why our government must remain in deed and truth monarchic.”^̂  His 
earlier Anglophilia vanished completely. “In regard to the monarchy,” writes Langer, 
“Treitschke ordered the German liberals to no longer try to emulate the English model, 
but rather finally to understand that the monarchic attitude was unshakably anchored in 
the German nation.”*®*̂
After 1866, Treitschke focused all his efforts on the task of German unification. 
He became frustrated when Bismarck failed “to arouse the moral energies of the 
nation.” ®̂* The chancellor was a political genius, but he was too much the Realpolitiker 
for Treitschke, who regarded German unification as a moral and emotional calling. In an 
essay he wrote about the Italian statesman Cavour, for which he was awarded the Italian
Langer, 138. 
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Commander Cross/^^ Treitschke implied that even deception of the people was justified 
in pursuit of a goal as virtuous as national unifieation; “To warm one’s hands over the 
smoking ruins of the Fatherland with the smug self-praise: I never told a lie—this is the 
virtue of a monk, not of a man.’’̂ ^̂  According to Treitsehke, the “virtuous” goal of 
national unification exempted states and statesmen fi-om the moral constraints of ordinary 
men.
Although the 1866 war had united the north German states under Prussian 
guidance, the south German states such as Bavaria and Württemberg remained 
independent of Prussia. It seemed as though a war with France would be necessary to 
pull these territories into the Prussian orbit. In his memoirs Bismarck wrote that he had 
always believed that “a Franco-German war must take place before the construction of a 
united Germany could be realized.” '®'̂  Craig cautions that this statement should not 
necessarily be taken at face value since Bismarck never saw a war with France as 
“inevitable” and because the chancellor believed that Napoleon III could have been 
persuaded to relinquish the south German lands if he was convinced that that was what 
the people in those territories wanted. In any case, war with France was always a 
distinct possibility, and indeed war erupted in 1870.
Elated by this turn of events, Treitschke published “What We Demand from 
France” in the Preussische Jahrbiicher, in whieh he “combined contempt for the beaten 
foe with an unabashed imperialism.” '̂  ̂ He called for the armexation of Alsace and 
Lorraine, arguing that the territory was “German” and rightly belonged under the control
Hausrath, 54.
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of the German Empire: “These provinces are ours by right of the sword; and we will rule 
them in virtue of a higher right, in virtue of the right of the German nation to prevent the 
permanent estrangement from the German Empire of her lost children.” '*̂’ Treitschke 
argued that by annexing the two French provinces Germany would grow stronger as a 
nation, particularly because the region offered promising economic opportunities. The 
soil of Alsace-Lorraine “oozes with fertility,” wrote Treitschke, and Germany was “by no 
means rich enough to renounce so precious a possession.”*®*
Treitschke was not alone in his enthusiasm for Prussia’s defeat of Napoleon Ill’s 
forces. The following year, his friend Gustav Freytag wrote of the war.
There never was a struggle fought for a greater ideal than this; never perhaps did Nemesis 
strike down the guilty so violently; never perhaps did any army have such a warmth, such 
inspiration, and such a deep poetic sense o f  the fact that the dreadful work o f the 
battlefields served a higher ethical purpose; never perhaps did the working o f divine 
providence in the apportionment o f rewards and punishments seem, in human terms, to 
be so just and logical as on this occasion. Hundreds o f  thousands perceived this as the 
poetry o f  the historical process...
On January 18, 1871, Emperor Wilhelm 1 was crowned in the Hall of Mirrors at
Versailles and Treitschke’s dream of a unified German state, including the disputed
provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, under Prussian leadership had been realized.
In spite of the creation of a German empire, Treitschke was not wholly satisfied
with Bismarck’s efforts at unifying the German nation. The Reich of 1871 did not
possess the political unity that he had wished for. “[QJuite considerable powers were
[indeed] left to the individual states,” explains Craig.**® Education and law enforcement
lay within state jurisdiction, as did the right to collect taxes. Treitschke felt that the
chaneellor had allowed the south German states too much autonomy and that Prussia’s
Treitschke, “Was fordern wir von Fmnkreich?” in Deutsche Kdmpfe 1, quoted in Davis, 110. 
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position in the empire was not strong enough.^** He always hated the special rights of 
Bavaria and Württemberg, whieh had even retained certain military rights, and 
complained that the empire’s structure was too f e d e ra l i s t .A d o l f  Hausrath, a friend of 
Treitschke’s, wrote that Treitsehke always remained disappointed in the nation;
The more he disliked the remnants o f particularism in the new Constitution, the less he 
was disposed to admire the Germans, who, in his opinion, had forfeited the greatest 
reward o f great times by their own individualism.''^
On the heels of the 1871 Reichsgrilndung Treitschke won election to a seat in the 
Reichstag as a pro-Bismarckian National Liberal. He served the same constituency, the 
district of Kreuznaeh-Simmem near Heidelberg, for his entire parliamentary career, 
which lasted until 1884 *̂ '̂  Treitschke’s deafness relegated him to a somewhat unique 
role in the Reichstag; “he saw himself raising his voice on special occasions only,” 
explains Dorpa len .O vera l l ,  Treitschke was severely disappointed with the German 
parliament, expressing serious doubts about its ability to affect any legislation. 
Interestingly, he also resented Bismarck’s methods of dealing with the Reichstag, 
complaining once in a letter to his wife Emma of the “scornful treatment” the body 
received from the chancellor.**^
In 1874 Treitschke left Heidelberg for a cherished position at the University of 
Berlin, where he remained until his death in 1896. It was there that Treitschke built a 
reputation as one of the most, if  not the most, vocal defenders of the German Reich of 
1871. His lectures on politics at the university and his seven-volume German History, 
published between 1879 and 1894 and discussed in detail below, defined his years in
Dorpalen, “Heinrich von Treitschke,” 28. 
Hausrath, 60.
Ibid., 61.
Davis, 117; Dorpalen, Treitschke, 180. 
Dorpalen, Treitschke, 181.
Treitschke, quoted in Dorpalen, Treitschke, 183.
40
Berlin. They represented the crystallization of the historian’s thought and reveal the 
dramatic shift his political outlook had taken since his youth. The lectures and History 
espoused the values of a powerful state apparatus and lauded the efforts of the 
Hohenzollems and Prussia as sincere defenders of all German interests. His lectures and 
History established Treitschke as a national hero in the eyes of many Germans.
While in Berlin Treitschke finally shed any remnants of his earlier liberalism. 
While his political worldview had become decidedly illiberal by the 1870s, Treitschke 
had remained a member of the National Liberals. In July of 1879, however, frustrated 
with liberal efforts to check the activities of Bismarck, the fiery historian parted ways 
with his former partisans and spent his remaining five years in the Reichstag as an 
independent.*^^ Ten years later, in 1889, Treitschke severed his last remaining 
connection to the liberalism of his earlier days. On the opening page of the July 1889 
issue of the Preussische Jahrbiicher, the ranks of which he had joined at the journal’s 
inception in 1857 and which he had edited since 1866, Treitschke formally “[bade] 
farewell to [his] readers,” marking the end of his career with one of Germany’s most 
influential political journals. * ** The Jahrbiicher had provided a medium for Treitschke to 
publish some of his most important treatises. The conservative Treitschke had fallen out 
with his younger co-editor, Hans Delbriick, who had once described himself as a 
“conservative Social Democrat.”**̂  The younger editor had also grown frustrated with
Treitschke’s increasing dogmatism and his combative attitude toward political
120opponents.
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Treitschke died in 1896 in Berlin while still trying to eomplete his German 
History- In his obituary of the national historian, Friedrieh Meineeke described 
Treitschke as “one of the mightiest men Germany had ever p r o d u c e d . B y  1896 the 
historian had eertainly become a prominent national figure. In his life Treitschke had 
witnessed monumental political events in Germany and had been instrumental in 
encouraging and procuring popular support for national unification in 1871. In his youth 
Treitschke was drawn to liberal idealism with its advocacy of constitutional and 
parliamentary government, but he grew inereasingly committed to the eoneept of a 
powerful monarchieal state. Indeed, by the time he moved to Berlin in 1874 Treitschke 
had solidified his belief in Germany’s national mission, whieh he presented to the 
German people in his lectures and in his German History.
Friedrich Meineeke, “Heinrich von Treitschke,” Historische Zeitschrift 11 (1896), 86-90.
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CHAPTER TWO
TREITSCHKE’S NATIONAL MISSION: 
THE GERMAN HISTORY POLITICS
43
I. Introduction
In 1874 Heinrich von Treitschke secured a chair at the University of Berlin and 
moved to the German capital, where he lived until his death in 1896. During his years in 
Berlin, Treitschke authored his monumental History o f  Germany in the Nineteenth 
Century, a seven-volume history of his nation that spanned the course of German history 
from the days of the Reformation to the eve of the 1848 revolutions. Treitschke hoped 
that his history would instill in his countrymen a common national consciousness and an 
awareness of their national mission. In the dedicatory preface to the first volume, which 
first appeared in 1879, Treitschke proclaimed that his aim was to “awaken in the hearts of 
his readers.. .a delight in the fatherland.”^
While in Berlin, Treitschke also made a name for himself by giving his now 
notorious lectures on “Politics” at the University. Almost all the literature published on 
Treitschke makes at least a cursory reference to the throngs of Germans who turned out 
to hear him lecture. These crowds included enrolled students, auditors, and people from 
the general public, such as professionals and businessmen.^ Many, hoping to watch the 
renowned orator, were turned away disappointed, as Treitschke regularly filled his lecture 
hall to capacity. “[Treitschke’s] course on Politics,” writes Andreas Dorpalen,
became something o f an institution, with a ritual o f its own, held before overflow 
audiences in the largest auditorium o f Berlin’s university Here thousands o f  young men 
who were later to attend to the public affairs o f the country, administer its laws, and 
educate its young were taught disdain o f commercial occupations.. .and contempt for the 
lower classes. Here they were also told o f the inferiority o f Jews and non-Germans, the 
ineffectiveness of parliaments and political parties, and the salutary effects o f  war and 
aggressiveness.^
* Heinrich von Treitschke, History o f  Germany in the Nineteenth Century, translated by Eden and Cedar 
Paul, (New York: McBride, Nast & Company, 1915), 1 : vx.
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The content of both the German History and the lectures on politics—compiled 
from the notes of Treitschke’s students and published posthumously in 1897 as the two- 
volume Politics'̂ —reveals the mature thought of the German nationalist historian. In 
these two works Treitschke combined the political beliefs he had developed in earlier 
treatises to create a coherent system of thought regarding German national development 
and international relations. The historian, viewing relations among states as a quasi- 
Darwinian struggle for survival and dominance, presented a rigidly deterministic 
conception of history. Treitschke devoted most of his work to explaining how Prussia 
had emerged from this struggle as the defender of “German” interests and the unifier of 
the German state.
According to Treitschke the German nation-state owed its current strength and 
unity to the complementary forces of the Prussian state and German religious and 
intellectual freedom. In the opening pages o f his German History he wrote.
It is to two forces that we owe the restoration o f our declining nation, which since those 
days has transformed its life politically and economically, in faith, in art, and in science, 
to make that life ever richer and ever wider in its scope: the force o f  religious freedom, 
and the force o f the Prussian state.^
The historian presented the Hohenzollem monarchy and the Prussian state as the political
forces sincerely committed to German national unity. He devoted the bulk of his history
to discussing the methods by which the Prussian kings and statesmen endeavored to
realize German political unity. Moreover, Treitschke presented the German lands, and
Prussia in particular, as a haven of religious tolerance and free thought at a time when
Rome dominated the consciences of most Europeans. Because of the Hohenzollems’
Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics, translated by Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille, (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1916).
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45
commitment to intellectual freedom, they rightly inherited the role of leaders of 
civilization.
By developing these two points—religious freedom and the national mission of 
the Prussian state—Treitschke provided his audiences with two fundamental aspects of 
their national consciousness. First, his interpretation of Prussia as the traditional defender 
of German interests assigned to that power the mission of founding a German national 
state. Since Prussia had accomplished this mission when Treitschke wrote his history and 
delivered his lectures on politics, the political historian delegated to the unified German 
state the task of maintaining and enhancing state power. Secondly, Treitschke’s view of 
Prussia and Germany as defenders of religious and intellectual freedom designated the 
German nation as a chosen people. With Luther’s Reformation Germany became a 
Protestant Israel, and Treitschke encouraged the nation to become the leader of humanity.
Lastly, Treitschke’s German History gave his countrymen a final component of 
their national consciousness—a common national history. As mentioned above, 
Treitschke wanted his history to inspire in his readers “a delight in the fatherland” and in 
their common past. In doing so, however, the historian’s national bias often led him to 
misinterpret the course of German history. In his effort to establish a Prussian national 
mission and to present Germany as a promised land, Treitschke frequently misinterpreted 
the motives of Prussian sovereigns and statesmen.
II. The State
For Treitschke, state power represented the most fundamental and necessary 
objective of any society. Because he perceived society as a collection of competing
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groups each seeking to secure its own interests, Treitschke was convinced that only the 
state could stand above this struggle as an impartial mediator. Only the state could 
ensure social harmony. “Treitschke did not believe in the possibility of a self-regulating 
society,” writes Karl Metz. “The force holding the variety of groups together and thereby 
forming such a thing as ‘society’ was political dominance, i.e. the state.”  ̂ As the state 
represented the goal of any nation, Treitschke identified the tendency of nations to 
develop into states as the motive force of history.
Treitschke argued that humans carry an innate disposition for government, which 
eventually and inevitably leads them to found a state. A “natural” and “inevitable” 
product of human nature, “the State is the people” and each citizen represents a 
“fragment of the State.”  ̂ He saw this trend as such a necessary part of human nature that 
“the idea of a stateless humanity.. .is without historical warrant.”  ̂ The state represents 
the “outward form which a nation has moulded for itself.”  ̂ Not all states are the same, 
nor should they be. The peculiar character of every nation determines the character of its 
state, and this in turn shapes the nature of the mission that the nation-state shall pursue.
Treitschke drew from the thought of Machiavelli to support his theory of the state. 
He celebrated the “brilliant” Florentine’s “great idea that the State is Power” and stressed 
that “[w]e must never forget our debt to Machiavelli.” '^ He credited Machiavelli with 
“[setting] the State upon its own feet” and “[freeing] it from the moral sway of the 
Church.” It was Machiavelli who “[said] that the State should only strive towards the
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goal of its own power.” *̂ Treitschke condemned those who attacked Machiavelli’s 
theory of the state on moral grounds, such as the Jesuits, whom he portrayed as 
hypocrites who “daily practiced” what Machiavelli had preached/^
While Treitschke admired Machiavelli and lauded the realism of the Italian 
statesman, he did perceive one shortcoming in the Florentine’s ideal of the state. The 
German historian observed that Machiavelli’s theories provided no moral justification for 
state power; Treitschke maintained that the state indeed served a moral function. It 
represented the highest moral ideal of any people. Treitsehke espoused “the principle 
that the State is in itself an ethical force and a high moral good.”*̂  As its “highest moral 
duty,” the state shall “uphold its power.” '̂* Its primary duty is to maintain and increase its 
strength, as weakness is “the most disastrous and despicable of crimes, the unforgivable 
sin of politics.” *̂
The state must subordinate everything to its own power and will, both internally 
and externally. Domestically, Treitschke attacked “[t]he ridiculous idea of the State 
subordinate to Personal Rights” and demanded the “[sjteadfast loyalty” o f citizens, as it 
was “proof of the healthy condition of a State and a nation.” '^ Treitschke drew the 
conclusion that “[ejvery moral judgment of the historian must be based on the hypothesis 
of the State as power, constrained to maintain itself as such within and without, and of 
man’s highest, noblest destiny being eo-operation in this duty.”*̂
Exhibiting an extremely pessimistie view of human nature and convinced that a
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self-regulating society was “just another English illusion,” *̂ Treitschke asserted that the 
state must function as a moralizing and educating force, developing the spiritual and 
intellectual qualities of the nation. “The State is a moral community called to positive 
labours for the improvement of the human race,” Treitschke wrote, “and its ultimate aim 
is to build up real national character through and within itself, for this is the highest moral 
duty of nations as well as individuals.” '^ He demanded of the state, “the instrument of 
civilization,” “positive labour for the economic and intellectual welfare of its 
members.” "̂ The state should function as a “great institution for the education of the 
human race.” For this reason the state should be subject to moral law, but this appeal to 
morality drowned in a sea of fiery claims about the unqualified power of the state.^'
Treitschke also found support for his theory of the state in the thought o f Hegel, 
whose philosophy seemed to Treitschke to justify a strong, powerful state. Hegel, who 
“had the keenest intelligence in political matters” of all German philosophers, had 
“regarded the state as the actualization of the moral ideal.”^̂  Treitschke celebrated 
Hegel’s rejection of “the doctrine of natural rights” and the idea of contract government 
and credited the philosopher with
resurrect[ing] the somewhat hyperbolie conception held by classical antiquity, and an 
omnipotence accorded to the state which it had never possessed since the Christian world 
had recognized the right o f  the individual conscience.^^
Treitschke saw this idea as an appropriate antidote for the German people:
But to this people o f ours, which had so long sought its ideal in an anarchic freedom, the 
idolization o f the state could do little harm. Only through an overvaluation o f the state 
could the Germans attain to a vigorous sense o f the state.̂ '*
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At the head of the strong state prescribed by Treitschke should sit a monarch, not 
an elected official or body. He regarded a strong monarchy as the political institution 
best suited to governing the national state, and the Hohenzollem monarchy most fit to 
lead Germany on her national mission. Treitschke’s enthusiasm for the monarchical state 
may have been an effort to legitimize the existing Hohenzollem regime in Germany and 
the lack of strong parliamentary and constitutional government, but the vehemence with 
which he promoted monarchical government seems to reveal a sincere commitment to 
monarchism. For Treitschke, the monarchy represented an impartial mediator that stood 
above petty class interests; it could justly and efficiently settle social conflict, ensure 
social harmony, and, most importantly, promote national unity.
Treitschke referred to his teacher Dahlmann to strengthen his arguments about the 
superiority of monarchical government, paying tribute to his political conception of the 
state and monarchical government. In his Politics of 1835 Dahlmann, who had held 
“strictly monarchical inclinations,” had successfully “dragged political science from the 
charmed circle of the formulas of natural law.”^̂  Like Hegel, he rejected the notion of a 
social contract. Rather, he saw the state as “an original order, a necessary datum, an asset 
of mankind.”^̂  For Treitschke, it was Dahlmann who realized that a constitutional state 
could indeed “embody a vigorous political life” and who also championed the ideal of 
monarchical government.^’ He “termed the monarchy the sole bond of custom in the 
world of German states.” *̂
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Treitschke argued that the Prussian form of monarchy was inherently superior to 
the British parliamentary system. He chastised Montesquieu for his allegedly false 
conception of English government as the realization of the ideal of “the separation of 
these three authorities [the legislative, the judicial, and the federative], which must never 
be united in a single g r a s p . T h e  historian accused the French philosophe of a 
“stupendous error” for not recognizing that “the House of Commons both made laws and 
controlled the policy of the nation so completely that whoever had its confidence 
necessarily became the inspirer of England’s foreign policy.” ®̂
For Treitschke, the dominance of Parliament in British political life conflicted 
with his firm belief in the need for a strong monarchy that could ensure the unity of the 
state: “The essence of the State is its unity, and that State is the best organized in which 
these three powers are united in one supreme and independent hand.” *̂ “[Sjince the State 
is primarily power,” he opined, “that State which gathers authority most completely into 
the hand of one and there leaves it most independent, approaches most nearly to the 
ideal.”^̂  Obviously, Britain, with its emphasis on the representative institution of 
Parliament, had failed to do this. In Treitschke’s view, “It is an aneient experience that 
monarchy presents more perfectly than any other form of government a tangible 
expression of political power and national unity.”^̂
111. Prussia and the Hohenzollems 
As mentioned above, Treitschke saw the force of the Prussian state as one of the
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two fundamental forces working toward German national unity. Only Prussia, he argued, 
had been committed to establishing a German national state. Throughout his German 
History Treitsehke chronicled the efforts of the Hohenzollem and other Prussian 
statesmen to achieve national unity. In doing so he ascribed to Prussia motivations more 
in accord with the German national cause than with reality.
Treitsehke found inspiration for his argument about Prussia’s national mission in 
the thought of Hegel. Not only did Hegel provide an attractive theory of the state, but he 
also helped bolster Treitschke’s claims of a Prussian national mission in Germany. Hegel 
had acknowledged the necessity of a “vigorous” state, but he had also recognized “the 
abundant civilizing activity which the Prussian state had long been accustomed to display 
in practice.” By the 1830s, Hegel, who had opted out of the national movement during 
the wars of liberation, approvingly pointed out “what [the Germans] possessed in 
Pmssia.” According to Treitschke, Hegel had seen in Prussia “the noblest and most 
rational of the German states.” "̂̂
According to Treitschke, the real resurgence of the Prussian state, and 
consequently of Germany, began with the Great Elector, Frederick William of 
Brandenburg. “The greatest German of his day,” Frederick William arrived on the 
German political scene in order “to inspire the slumbering forces of his state with the 
might of his will. Never since that time has the strength of the purposive monarchical 
will of the developing German power known any decline.”^̂  In the Elector, Treitschke 
saw the personification of his ideal monarch, a leader who could stand above the
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squabbling masses, justly mediating between interest groups within society. As a 
monarch, Frederick William possessed
the two virtues upon which its greatness depends: a bold and far-seeing idealism which 
sacrifices the convenience o f to-day to the greatness o f tomorrow; and that strong sense 
of justice which ever constrains self-interest in the service o f the whole.. .It was only in 
the sense of duty to the crown, in the idea o f the monarchical state, that the mutually 
hostile tribes and estates, parties and churches, which were comprised within this 
microcosm o f German life, could find protection and peace.^®
In Treitschke’s view, the Elector’s state-building efforts in Brandenburg
threatened the status quo of the Holy Roman Empire: “its monarchical order threatened
the whole structure of feudal and theocratic institutions which supported the imperial
crown.”^̂  Frederick William planted the seeds o f future German greatness. “At length
Germany had again found one who could extend the empire,” Treitschke wrote. “With
the rise of Prussia there began the long and bloody task of the liberation of Germany from
foreign dominion.” *̂ The work of the Great Elector rekindled a sense of national pride in
Germany such that Treitschke could even equate Brandenburg to ancient Rome.
While tainted by an unbridled glorification of Frederick William and the
Hohenzollems, Treitschke’s account of the efforts of the Great Elector is not entirely
inaccurate. After his ascension to the throne in 1640, the Elector’s efforts were
unquestionably crucial to the formation of the Prussian state. Frederick William made a
conscious break with his diplomatic policy of securing and then violating defensive
alliances by building a Prussian army in order to take a more independent approach to
state security. In a 1653 agreement in which Frederick William granted the Junker
nobility extended powers and privileges in exchange for 530,000 Thalers, the Elector
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secured for himself the means to pay for a reliable standing army, which soon became the 
backbone of the new Prussian state, growing from a few thousand mercenaries in 1640 to 
30,000 men by 1688.^^
Treitschke’s portrayal of the efforts of the Great Elector as pivotal in the genesis 
of the Prussian state is supported by Gordon Craig, who agrees that the work of Frederick 
William had “revolutionary political consequences.”^̂  However, Treitschke, either 
intentionally or accidentally, confused the Great Elector’s efforts at state construction 
with an effort at nation building. The historian’s suggestion that the Great Elector’s 
efforts revived in Germany “the ancient stout-hearted pride in the fatherland” imposed 
too much of Germany’s present political situation onto the past."̂ * German national 
sentiment was not important to the Elector. Nor did he attempt to rally patriotic support 
of Brandenburg-Prussia, although he did “[instill] into the rag-bag collection of territories 
he inherited the beginnings of a common sense of statehood.”"̂^
The Great Elector’s heir, Frederick I, did not receive such hagiographie treatment 
from Treitschke. In fact, Treitschke only devoted a couple paragraphs to this first king in 
Prussia. Frederick did secure for the Hohenzollem the royal title of “Kings in Prussia” in 
exchange for aiding the Habsburgs in the War of Spanish Succession. Treitschke 
acknowledged the significance of this development, but he found few other acts of the 
first king praiseworthy. He wrote that Frederick had a “weak spirit” and lacked the 
admirable pride in the state that his father had had and his son and grandson would
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share/^ Treitschke did, however, compliment Frederick’s efforts to build universities in 
several Prussian cities and to sponsor some spectacular building projects. Treitschke’s 
interpretation of Frederick I was fairly accurate. James Sheehan presents Frederick in a 
similar manner, portraying him as a rather decadent ruler “who want[ed] to spend what 
the preceding generation had eamed.”'̂ '*
King Frederick William I, the Great Elector’s grandson, continued the 
centralization of the Prussian state in the eighteenth century. “[Ejven the laws of Stein 
and Schamhorst and the reforms of our own days,” wrote Treitschke, “could serve only to 
develop and not to destroy the work of the founder.. .[I]t was he who introduced into our 
history a new form of government, the circumscribed national unity of the modem 
m o n a r c h y . B u t  Frederick William I did not embark on a policy of state construction 
for personal advantage; he did not regard the new state
as a mere appenage o f his own house. Rather, in the mind o f the unlettered prince, was 
there conceived, clearly and vividly, a notion o f the state that was accordant with the new 
doctrine o f natural law: the notion that the state exists for the good o f all, and that the 
king is placed at its head to administer with unbiased justice over all the estates o f the 
realm, to pursue the public weal regardless o f all private privileges and preferences.'*®
Treitschke presented a fairly accurate view of King Frederick William, although it was
perhaps overly complimentary. In his history of Prussia, E.J. Feuehtwanger contends that
although the king devoted all his energies to the health of his state, he was “driven by an
unbalanced sense of mission and duty.”'*̂  He was not motivated to act for the sake of his
subjects or the development of the German nation, however. The desire for personal and
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dynastie aggrandizement, as well as his deeply Calvinistie convietions, motivated the 
king/"
Frederick William I also instituted administrative reforms that, in Treitsehke’s 
opinion, proved vital for Germany’s national development. In addition to the “liability to 
taxation” the king also imposed “universal military service and compulsory education, 
thus establishing the threefold group of general civic duties by which the people of 
Prussia have been trained in an active love of the fatherland.”"̂  ̂ As a result of these 
efforts, wrote Treitschke, “the road was unconsciously prepared for a strong national 
sentiment.” *̂’ In this case, at least, the historian recognized that Frederick William had 
not consciously sought national unity. Treitschke’s praise of Prussian conscription under 
Frederick William comes as no surprise, as he often commented on the instructive ability 
of military serviee. Ultimately, the historian concluded that the eivie reforms of the king 
created a sense of unity among the people of several dispersed regions: “the men of 
Magdeburg and Pomerania, of the Mark and of Westphalia, were welded together into a 
single Prussian people.”^̂  These efforts doubtless eontributed to the unity of the Prussian 
state, but by suggesting that they were intended to breed German patriotism, Treitsehke 
again misrepresented the true motives of the Hohenzollem dynasty.
Treitschke found the epitome of his ideal monarch in Frederick the Great, who 
reigned from 1740 to 1786 and once remarked, “My only God is my duty” ^̂  Treitschke 
welcomed his “pitiless and cruel German realism,” the defining trait of his reign.
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Because of his selfless devotion to the well being of his subjects, Frederick represented 
the model of a German king. Other countries, like France, had suffered under inferior 
monarchs: “The Bourbons never fully emerged from the vain notion of courtly 
deification and contempt for mankind, hence their shameful fall.” "̂* In contrast, 
Treitschke argued that Frederick reawakened among Germans “the monarchical 
sentiment which was in our people’s very blood.”^̂  The rule of Frederick instilled in the 
German people a faith in the monarehy as the one form of government that could fairly 
and effectively stand above societal divisions and justly govern the people. “In no other 
nation of modem history was the task of kingship understood in so great and lofty a 
sense,” Treitschke wrote, “and for this reason the German people remained.. .the most 
monarchieal in sentiment among all the great civilized nations.”^̂
In Treitschke’s view, Frederick’s reign truly marked the beginning of Prussia’s 
rise and the growth of German national consciousness. Of course, Treitschke had praised 
the efforts of all the Hohenzollems, but in the achievements of Frederick Europe traly 
witnessed “the formation of a great German power which should defend the fatherland 
with the strong hand in the east and in the west.”^̂  Under Frederick Pmssia became 
strong enough to pursue a genuinely independent policy free fi’om the interference of 
Austria, France, Britain, or Sweden. Unlike any of his predecessors, Frederick succeeded 
in asserting “a policy that was Prassian, and Pmssian only. To this policy belonged 
Germany’s future.” *̂ To aecount for Frederick’s lack of tme patriotic enthusiasm, 
Treitschke argued that he possessed a silent, almost divine, dedication to the German
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cause. “It was not the way of this hater of phrases to talk much of the fatherland,” wrote 
Treitschke, “and yet his soul was animated by a vigorous national pride.”^̂
Treitschke presented Frederick’s great military victories, such as his conquest of 
Silesia, as victories for the cause of German national unity. While the king’s military 
efforts certainly challenged Austrian hegemony in Central Europe, Treitschke’s 
assertions that the king’s conquest of Silesia was “a genuinely German deed” and that 
“his soul was animated by a vigorous national pride” blatantly misinterpreted the motives 
of the king. Frederick’s designs on Silesia stemmed from a desire for personal, not 
national, g l o r y . A t  the beginning of the second Silesian War in 1744, Frederiek did 
indeed try to rally imperial opinion against Austria and even suggested the formation of 
an imperial army under the command of the Bavarian Emperor Charles Vll to oppose the 
Austrians, but this was by no means an effort to cultivate German patriotism.^*
Feuchtwanger concedes that Prussia’s victorious emergence from the Seven 
Years’ War did arouse “the first faint stirrings of national sentiment,” and says that a 
patriotic attitude did begin to emerge under Frederick, but these sentiments centered not 
on the abstract idea of a German nation, but rather on the heroic figure of Frederick. 
“Neither [the Great Elector nor Frederick the Great] felt conscious of any German 
mission,” writes Dorpalen, “nor did anyone else in their time.”^̂  In fact, Dorpalen 
reiterates the position of Franz Schnabel, who says that Frederiek 11’s policies 
represented a “revolt against the German unity embodied in the empire.”^̂  Moreover, 
despite his popularity, Frederick failed to win popular support for his state. The
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Frederician state consisted of a mass of automatons who felt little patriotic attachment to 
Prussia and expressed little remorse when Napoleon crushed the Hohenzollem forces at 
Jena in 1806.^^
Following Prussia’s defeat at Jena, the task of advancing Prussia’s—and 
Germany’s—national mission was assumed hy a set of Prussian statesmen who instituted 
a series of reforms in an effort to modernize the Prussian state. These men worked to 
reinvigorate the Prussian state in the midst of Napoleon’s domination, and their reforms 
laid the foundation for the German Reich of 1871. “In this time of sorrow and self- 
knowledge,” wrote Treitschke, “were first formed all the political ideals for whose 
realization the German nation is working to this day.”^̂  These reforms were indeed vital 
to Prussia’s resurgence after years of Napoleonic domination, and for the first time the 
Pmssian state genuinely sought to generate patriotic sentiment in Germany. The Pmssian 
reformers— among them Stein, Schamhorst, and Gneisenau—consciously attempted to 
replace the “mechanistic” Frederician state with a more organic state to which Germans 
would feel bound hy a strong sense of duty. The reformers wanted a citizenry morally 
committed to its state, envisioning the reformed state as a moral institution; “they 
demanded from the rejuvenated German state that it should protect religion, art, and 
science, all the ideal aims of the human race.”^̂
In his analysis of the reform era, Treitschke emphasized the work of Heinrich von 
Stein, “the pioneer of the age of reform.”^̂  Appointed minister of foreign and domestic 
affairs in 1807, Stein, a non-Pmssian hailing from Nassau, held a deep conviction and
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commitment to the ideal of German unity, a conviction that “was instilled in the cradle 
into this proud lord.” *̂ Treitschke maintained that Stein’s political convictions derived 
from a “powerful moral idealism” fostered “by the hard school of the Prussian official 
s e r v i c e . S t e i n ’s monarchist sentiments appealed to Treitschke, as did Stein’s “Prussian 
sense of duty,” which the baron opposed to the “greedy [French] revolutionary sentiment, 
whieh demanded from the state unending human rights.”’® Treitschke found the work of 
Stein invaluable to the development of the German nation: “Every advance in our 
political life has brought the nation back to Stein’s ideals.”’* Stein “undertook.. .the 
completion of the unity of the state.”’  ̂ He created ministerial offices for the departments 
of “home affairs, finanee, foreign affairs, war, and justice,”’  ̂eentralizing the Prussian 
state and making it a more efficient governing apparatus.
In 1807, King Frederick William III entrusted General Gerhard von Schamhorst 
with the task of reorganizing the army. Treitschke noted that the king saw in the army a 
useful apparatus for the education of the nation and “[he] impressed it upon the officers 
that they should never cease to realize their honourable position as educators and teachers 
of a noteworthy portion of the nation.”’  ̂ Treitschke himself was very attraeted to the 
notion of the army as a sort of “school of the nation,” a theme evident throughout many 
of his writings. For Treitschke, the army reforms greatly contributed to the growth of 
German patriotism: “The fundamental idea of all these reforms was that heneeforward 
the army was to consist of the people in arms, it was to be a national army, to which
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everyone capable of bearing arms must belong.”^̂  These reforms helped to affect what 
Schamhorst called “the intimate union of the army with the nation.”^̂  Treitschke, who 
associated the reforms of the army with the birth of national consciousness, quoted 
Schamhorst approvingly:
The sense o f independence must be instilled into the nation, which must be given an 
opportunity o f becoming acquainted with itself, and learn how to gain respect from 
others. All that we can do is work towards this end. We must loosen the bonds of 
prejudice, guide the rebirth o f the nation; care for its growth, and not hinder its free 
development; more than it is not in our power to do.’^
In his effort to glorify the Hohenzollem monarchy Treitschke credited Frederick 
William III with the initiation of the military reforms, asserting that the king “gave the 
first impetus” for the reorganization of the army/^ Treitschke’s praise may have been 
misplaced. Gordon Craig points out that the king looked upon Schamhorst’s plans for a 
national militia “with disfavour from the very first.”^̂  So, while Frederick William III 
certainly played an important role in approving the military reforms, he cannot really be 
credited for their content or success.
Treitschke’s contention that the army reformers sought to build a tmly “national” 
army that could rally the sentiment of the nation accurately interpreted the motives of the 
reformers. Stein once remarked that a combination of a standing army and a national 
militia could successfully “inculcate a proud warlike national character” upon society. 
Hermann von Boyen, a Prassian commander, remarked that a national army would 
constitute a “school of the nation.”** Another, August Gneisenau wanted to “awaken”
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the energies “asleep in the bosom of the nation.”*̂
Treitschke argued that the Prussian reformers sought to form a state radically 
different from that of the French, who “pursued a tendency of secondary importance, 
directed to the simple manifestation of power.”*̂  Greatly influenced by Edmund Burke, 
the conservative Stein despised the French Revolution for its destruction of the 
monarchy.*'^ He and the other reformers envisioned a German state that would “protect 
religion, art, and science, all the ideal aims of the human race, for their own sake.”^̂  
Treitschke cited another key figure of the army reforms. General August Gneisenau, who 
once proclaimed, “First make the human race enthusiasts for duty, and only after that for 
rights!”*̂  For Treitschke, all of the Prussian reforms were inherently superior to the 
violent transition of the French Revolution: “From the first, the Prussian officers 
conceived the ideas of universal military service in a freer and juster sense than did the 
bourgeoisie under the Freneh Direetory.”^̂
Treitschke’s interpretation of the reform period is in many ways accurate. Yet his 
insistence that men like Stein, Schamhorst, and Gneisenau sought to mould a state 
fundamentally different from that of France falsely represented their motives. While they 
wished to avoid a violent revolution, they modeled their reform program on the political 
and social reforms they witnessed in France and “sought to adapt many of [the French] 
reforms for the strengthening of their own country.”** Koppel Pinson observes that Stein,
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Schamhorst, and especially Karl August von Hardenberg, wanted to integrate 
revolutionary ideals into the Prussian monarchical system.*^ The reforms did have, as 
Treitschke suggested, the ultimate effect of invigorating German national consciousness. 
“It was during these days of convulsive excitement,” wrote Treitschke approvingly, “that 
there first awakened in North Germany the idea of German unity.”^̂
Finally, with the benefit of hindsight, Treitschke presented Pmssian efforts to 
ereate a German Customs Union as vital to the development of the German national state. 
Since Austria’s influence in the Bund deterred Pmssia from taking political steps toward 
unity, Pmssian statesmen, particularly F.C.A. Motz, pursued the national mission by 
economic means, a tactic to which the Austrians were completely oblivious. Of Motz, 
appointed minister of finance by Frederick William, Treitschke wrote that he held 
“[mjeasureless.. contempt for the petty courts,” viewed himself as “a pioneer of German 
civilization,” and “lived entirely for the state.” *̂ The historian credited Motz with 
consciously initiating the proeess of Germany’s revolt from Austria:
At a time when the official German world regarded the perpetual league between Austria 
and Prussia as an inviolable law, [Motz] marched unhesitatingly towards the attainment 
o f another end, the permanent union, o f all Germany, Austria excluded, by the 
indestructible bond o f economic interests.®^
Treitschke portrayed New Year’s Day 1834— the day the Customs Union officially came
into being—as a national festival with jubilant crowds gathered at toll booths. He even
wrote that “from a remote distanee eould already be heard the guns of Koniggratz,”^̂  a
phrase that reduced the significance of the event to a “pathetic cliché,” in the words of
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one historian.^"^
Treitschke clearly saw—or at least sought to portray—the Customs Union as a 
crucial development in Germany’s struggle for unity, and he did not miss the opportunity 
to praise the Hohenzollem for its role in the accomplishment. While he lauded the efforts 
of Motz and other statesmen such as J.A.F. Eichhom and Karl Georg Maassen, who 
played a pivotal role in establishing the Zollverein, he claimed that their efforts would 
have come to naught had it not been for the work of King Frederick William. “The 
unpretentious simplicity of his nature,” explained Treitschke, “enabled him...to sow the 
seed [5ic] of a great future.”^̂
In his interpretation of the Zollverein, Treitschke again misrepresented the true 
motives of the Prussian state, an error that, as James J. Sheehan observes, many historians 
of Wilhelmine Germany committed. Wilhelm Roscher, one of Treitschke’s former 
mentors, once called the Customs Union “not only the most beneficial, but also the 
greatest event in German history between Waterloo and Koniggratz.”^̂  Sheehan 
describes the Zollverein as “perhaps the period’s most famous bureaucratic 
accomplishment,” but maintains that it “was essentially a fiscal measure.”^̂  In reality, 
the Zollverein played little or no role in encouraging German political unity: “In 
retrospect, of course, the Zollverein seemed to fit perfectly into the story of Prussia’s 
‘national mission’ to unify Germany. Actually, the tariff union had little to do with the 
nation.. In fact, Sheehan even doubts the economic benefits of the Union, noting that 
some goods such as tobacco and wine remained taxable, that the Zollverein lacked a
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uniform system of weights and measures, and that international influences continued to 
affect the domestic economies of the German s t a t es .D av id  Blackboum agrees that “it 
is important to recognize that the customs union was a product of Prussian geographical 
division and fiscal interests, not part of a long-term ‘German’ programme.”*®®
IV. Religious Freedom
In addition to the centralizing and unifying force of the Prussian state and the 
Hohenzollems, Treitschke also identified religious freedom as the second important 
aspect of her national mission. He presented the German Reformation as a rebellion 
against the intellectual and spiritual imperialism of Catholicism, supported by Rome and 
the Habsburgs. The national historian saw Pmssia, writ large as the German nation, as a 
chosen land; the Germans had become God’s chosen people. Because of this tradition of 
religious tolerance and intellectual liberty, argued Treitschke, Germany rightly deserved 
to occupy a position of world hegemony and become the next leader of civilization.
Germany tmly realized her national mission during the Reformation. Treitschke 
portrayed Martin Luther as the great savior not only of the Germans, but also of all 
humanity. The effect of Luther’s reform was to fi-ee “the State from the dominion of the 
Church.” Treitschke wrote that “the nation hailed the Monk of Wittenberg with shouts of 
exultation, and, moved to the depths of its being, awaited an entire transformation of the 
empire.”*®* Luther became a tme national hero as a cmsader for spiritual and intellectual 
freedom. Treitschke portrayed “the free movement of ideas” as the defining trait of the
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German nation. It was the “holy of holies of the nation of Martin Luther.”'*̂^
While perhaps a bit exaggerated, Treitschke’s suggestion that the German 
Reformation was partly a national movement is not entirely false. Luther did gather 
many supporters, and Hajo Holbom has acknowledged that “national sentiment was a 
subordinate element in Luther’s opposition to Rome.”'°  ̂ Moreover, most of the German 
estates were opposed to papal authority and the imperial diet in Augsburg “had shown 
passionate aversion to Rome.” '̂ "̂
Not only had Luther’s attack on the Church resulted in a break between Germany 
and Rome, but it also marked the beginning of an Austro-Prussian and, for Treitschke, an 
Austro-“German” antagonism, even though many South Germans remained Catholic 
during the Reformation. The empire of the Habsburgs, whieh remained Catholic, would 
“[remain] henceforward, until its inglorious fall, the enemy of all that was traly 
German.” ®̂̂ Throughout the rest of his seven-volume history Treitsehke presented 
Austria and the Habsburgs as the historical enemy of all German interests, which were 
untiringly defended by the Prassian state and the Hohenzollem crown. In Treitsehke’s 
opinion “Austria did nothing for Germany, while Prussia alone was in a position to do 
justice to the longings of the nation.”*®̂ Treitschke likely portrayed Austria as a 
traditional enemy of “Germany” in order to legitimize the kleindeutsch unification of the 
empire in 1871. To account for the fact that a large population of German-speaking 
Austrians lay outside the Kaiserreich, Treitsehke suggested that they were historical
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enemies of Germany, an assertion based in part on their loyalty to the Catholic Church.
The Thirty Years’ War, or the “war of the religions”, as Treitschke called it, 
represented another landmark in Germany’s national mission, as it was this catastrophe 
that alerted Germans to the above-mentioned fundamental forces that built their nation: 
religious freedom and the Prussian state. “In a disturbance without parallel, the old 
Germany passed away,” Treitschke wrote. “Those who had once aimed at world- 
dominion were now, by the pitiless justice of history, placed under the feet of the 
stranger.” All the lands of Germany became the “captives of foreign nations.. .Never was 
any other nation so forcibly estranged from itself and from its own past.”'®̂  It appeared 
as though the religious wars signaled “the destruction of the German name.”
Miraculously, though, “[I]n those days of misery, in the time of the Peace of Westphalia, 
our new history begins.”*®*
In the midst of religious upheaval and warfare, Prussia emerged as the guardian of 
religious freedom. Because the German lands contained Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, 
and Jews, the Hohenzollems had to defend all four. “Thus originated,” wrote Treitschke,
the peculiar duplex attitude o f the Hohenzollems towards our ecclesiastical life: with the 
fall o f the power o f the Palatinate they became the leaders o f  militant Protestantism in the 
empire, but had also to represent the fundamental idea o f the new German civilization—  
freedom o f religious belief.'”®
Prussian monarchs, such as the Great Elector, Frederick I, and Frederick the Great, did
indeed champion the ideals of religious tolerance, yet Treitschke’s celebration of Prussia
as a religious haven may have been intended to serve more eontemporary objeetives. In a
state containing Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jews, Treitsehke did not wish to
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alienate any group from the national cause. The only way to bring these disparate groups 
together was through an emphasis on tolerance and “freedom of religious belief.”
Treitschke portrayed the Great Elector as a champion of Germany’s mission and 
the guardian of spiritual freedom. The Prussia of Frederick William was “the first state in 
Europe in which complete religious freedom was secured.. .in Brandenburg the throne 
stood free above all the Churches and protected their equality.” ''*’ In fact, according to 
Treitschke, Prussia offered asylum for religious refugees from across the continent and 
became a magnet for persecuted peoples. When Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes, 
the Elector responded with his own Edict of Potsdam, which “offered protection and 
shelter to the children of the martyr-Church.”" '  Frederick William also granted religious 
freedom to Jews, who traveled to Brandenburg from Vienna, while Protestants flocked 
from Heidelberg.
Treitschke’s portrayal of Frederick William as a defender of Protestantism and of 
religious freedom is also accurate. The Elector’s Calvinism certainly motivated him to 
strengthen his state, as he recognized a need for a strong Protestant German state to 
ensure the future of the faith. His devotion to the Calvinist faith also prompted 
Frederick William to offer shelter to his French co-religionists. In 1685 he issued his 
Edict of Potsdam, which inspired the widespread immigration of French Huguenots into 
Brandenburg. As a Calvinist in a Lutheran land, the Elector likely also saw this 
maneuver as a means of bolstering political support in his territory. In 1671 he also lifted 
restrictions on Jews in Brandenburg."^
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Frederick the Great also stood as a crusader against “Roman” tyranny in 
Treitschke’s eyes. The historian suggested that Prussia’s victory in the Seven Years’ War 
represented the greatest blow to the Roman church since the heresy of Martin Luther. To 
him Frederick was like Luther—a crusader for the well being of humanity. “King 
Frederick had in truth,” wrote Treitschke, “been fighting for the freedom of the human 
race.”**'* Treitschke lauded Frederick’s conquest of Silesia, a predominantly Catholic 
region, in the War of the Austrian Succession as “a genuinely German deed,” rather than 
the power-based political move that it really was. The region’s prosperity after the 
Prussian conquest apparently confirmed “that the new province had found its natural 
master.” ' P r u s s i a ’s victorious emergence from the Seven Years’ War proved the 
“irrevocable necessity” of “the new order o f German affairs, whieh had begun with the 
foundation of the Prussian power.”
V. The Struggle of Nations 
In addition to his efforts to establish the national mission of the Prussian state as 
the defender of German interests and a leader of humanity, Treitschke’s German History 
reflected its author’s conception of international relations, which he perceived as a quasi- 
Darwinian struggle among nation-states. Many scholars have labeled Treitschke a social 
Darwinist, but Paul Crook smartly observes that Treitschke’s theory of international 
relations should not be interpreted as Darwinian “solely by virtue of the fact that [his]
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bellicose utterances succeeded the publication of Darwin’s Origin Mike Hawkins 
further explains that Treitschke’s doctrine o f Machtpolitik ~was not really Darwinian 
because Treitschke did not provide a “materialist rationale for power politics,” as 
Bemhardi and others did after him.'** In other words, Treitschke’s work was not 
Darwinian because for him the struggle among nations was a struggle for prestige, for 
what he called the right to lead civilization, rather than a struggle for resources necessary 
for national survival.
Within this struggle, vigorous nations rose to positions of regional and global 
dominance while weaker nations declined. During the late 1800s, Treitschke portrayed 
Great Britain and her overseas empire as the hegemonic power in the world. He also 
portrayed Austria as the hegemonic power in Central Europe and France, for a short time 
at least, as the hegemon in Europe. The story of his German History is in large part the 
story of Prussia’s struggle against these three imperialist powers. The German History 
worked to expose the alleged tyranny of these hostile powers and celebrated Prussian 
efforts to throw off the yokes of France and Austria and to challenge Great Britain’s 
global position. In both his lectures and his History Treitschke encouraged his fellow 
Germans to take up the national cause and bring Germany to a position of world 
hegemony through colonial expansion overseas. The whole future of the nation, he 
argued, depended on it. This type of imperial expansion would almost certainly entail 
war with other imperialist nations, something that Treitschke celebrated for its ability to 
unite peoples and strengthen nations.
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Revolutionary and Napoleonic France represented for Treitschke one of the most 
detrimental forces acting against the goal of German national unity. Most unfortunate in 
Treitschke’s view was the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine in July of 1806, 
when “[sjixteen German princes separated themselves from the empire, declared 
themselves to be sovereign, and further declared that every law of the ancient and 
honorable national comity was null and inoperative.” Furthermore, “they recognized 
Napoleon as their protector” and pledged military support for France in the case of 
war.**  ̂ Designed by Napoleon “as a counterweight to Prussia and Austria,”*̂® the 
Confederation represented for Treitschke a tragic development in the history of the 
German nation. With the founding of the Rhenish Confederation, the old Holy Roman 
Empire and the unity it embodied ceased to exist.
Treitschke was extremely suspicious of the French desire to spread revolutionary 
republican ideals throughout the continent and even the world: “the French now regarded 
themselves as the Messiahs of freedom.”*̂ ’ He lamented that the French saw themselves 
as cultural leaders and noted that General Lafayette prophesied “that the [new tricolor] 
should wave round the world.”*̂  ̂ As mentioned above, Treitschke worked to discredit 
the violent upheaval of the French Revolution and the reforms that it entailed. French 
hegemony in Germany threatened to destroy the Prussian monarchical order.
Fortunately, however, “Frederick William was not inclined to allow the prestige of his
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crown to be endangered.”^̂  ̂ The reforms of Stein and his other ministers effectively 
rejuvenated the Prussian state, enabling it to defeat Napoleon’s forces in 1813.
France’s defeat in the Wars of Liberation and Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo 
did not, however, eliminate the French threat to Germany Treitschke remained hostile to 
France for the rest of his life. As late as 1870, in his pamphlet entitled “What We 
Demand of France,” he promoted the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine and advocated 
harsh peace terms for the Freneh following that country’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian 
War. In his Politics he deelared that Germany was involved in a “latent” war with 
Franee, even though the two powers were “outwardly fiiendly.”*̂"̂ In his History 
Treitschke had written that “[t]he [French] nation was accustomed to despise every 
foreign power.” '̂  ̂ Treitschke almost certainly sought to portray the French as inherently 
xenophobic and hostile, a characteristic he believed to be no less true in 1896 than it was 
in 1806.
After the expulsion of the French from Germany in 1813, the Habsburg Empire 
stood as the greatest obstacle to German national unity. In the opening pages of the 
German History, Treitschke railed against the Habsburgs, who had supposedly exploited 
their favorable position within the Holy Roman Empire to dominate all of Germany.
“For our people,” he wrote, “the imperial rule of the Hapsburgs was a foreign 
dominion.”’^̂  In his biography of Treitschke, Andreas Dorpalen has pointed out the 
inaccuracy of such a statement; “it was an entirely unhistoric view to deseribe the
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Habsburg phase of the Holy Roman Empire as one of alien rule in German eyes.” *̂  ̂
Treitschke made other efforts to alienate Austria from the greater cultural and 
geographical Germany; in the opening pages of the German History he argued that since 
the Peace of Westphalia “Austria has remained apart from the community of German 
life."'^^
For Treitschke, the Congress of Vienna and the subsequent meetings of the 
European concert represented a conspiracy of the Great Powers to thwart German 
national unity and foil the aspirations of Prussia. According to Treitschke, the Prussian 
representatives at the Congress of Vienna were committed to promoting their state’s 
mission as the defender and unifier of the German nation. “To them,” wrote Treitschke, 
“the national political development was a matter in which they put their whole hearts.” *̂  ̂
Their efforts came to naught, however, in the face of the opposition of the other European 
powers. In fact, Treitschke went so far as to say that at Vienna “the whole world was 
united in fighting Prussia.”*̂®
Treitschke’s chief villain in this story was Austrian foreign minister Clemens von 
Mettemieh. The historian demonized Mettemich, “the Adonis of the drawing rooms,” ^̂* 
for his German policy that aimed at keeping the German states in political disunity and 
subordinate to Habsburg dominance. He was Prussia and Germany’s arch nemesis, a 
man who worked to ensure “[a] persistent state of disintegration in Germany, so that the 
sovereign petty kings should voluntarily turn to Austria for protection against Prussia and
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against ‘the dangerous idea of German u n i t y . T r e i t s e h k e  remarked that this poliey 
“had no inkling of the motive forees of history,” revealing his convietion that nations 
naturally evolve into states with young and vibrant nations rising to challenge old and 
decaying ones. Mettemich was joined in his opposition to German unity by the 
Habsburg Emperor Francis, “the sworn enemy of all innovations, the suspicious opponent 
of the two ambitious neighbor powers, Russia and, above all, Pmssia.”*'’'̂  Treitschke’s 
arguments about the Austrians’ efforts to squash the German national movement are 
probably not inaccurate. However, Treitsehke’s vehemence toward Francis and 
especially toward Mettemich, whom he called the “vainest of men,”^̂  ̂certainly 
discredited their accuracy.
One of Mettemich’s greatest triumphs in opposing German national development 
was the Federal Act of 1815, which established the German Confederation. Intended to 
replace the old Empire, the Confederation, or Bund, represented a loose alliance of 
German states, including Austria and Prassia, who competed for influence within it.
Those who had wanted greater German political unity at the time were greatly 
disappointed with the Confederation because it ensured a significant degree of 
sovereignty for the individual states within it. According to Treitsehke, Mettemich saw 
the Confederation as “the most suitable means for effectively checking Pmssian 
ambition! The Federal Act of June 8, 1815, which recognized the “independence and 
inviolability of the individual German states,” was a “catastrophe” and ensured “the
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triumph of particularism” in Germany/
Political developments that Treitschke witnessed during his own life also greatly 
influenced his scholarly bias. After the Reichsgrilnding, the historian increasingly saw 
Britain as Germany’s chief rival in fulfilling her national mission. Britain had enjoyed 
her tenure as the dominant world power, now it was the young and vigorous Germany’s 
turn to assert herself on the international stage. Treitschke hurled many of his harshest 
criticisms at the British, whom he portrayed as crass, materialistic Mammon worshipers;
The hypocritical Englishman, with the Bible in one hand and a pipe o f opium in the other, 
possesses no redeeming qualities. The nation was an ancient robber-knight, in full armor, 
lance in hand, on every one o f the world’s trade routes.. .The English possess a 
commercial spirit, a love o f money which has killed every sentiment o f honor and every 
distinction o f right and wrong. English cowardice and sensuality are hidden behind 
unctuous, theological fine talk which is to us free-thinking German heretics among all the 
sins of English nature the most repugnant. In England all notions o f honor and class 
prejudices vanish before the power o f money, whereas the German nobility has remained 
poor but chivalrous.*^*
Treitschke reserved some of his harshest words for British statesmen such as Castlereagh 
and Canning. The Britons at Vienna, he wrote, were “crotchety” and possessed a 
“preposterous arrogance.” He described Lady Castlereagh as “gigantic.” ^̂ ^
Treitschke interpreted Great Britain’s policy as opportunistic and imperialistic 
and maintained that English statesmen had intentionally played the continental powers 
off against one another in order to build their own world empire with minimal European 
competition. In his discussion of Canning’s policies, Treitschke noted that
British commerce would thrive most securely i f  the continent were never at rest, if  the 
economic energies o f the nations o f Europe were paralysed by civil wars; then the 
fortunate island nation could consolidate undisturbed that dominion over the seas which 
she regarded as her natural heritage.
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Treitschke traced this attitude toward continental affairs back to the Pitts, who “had 
employed the high-sounding phrase of the European balance of power as an oratorical 
wrapping for the concealment of their policy which aimed at England’s command of the 
sea.”'"'
England’s position as Europe’s dominant maritime power represented for 
Treitschke not merely a position of strength but also one of tyranny. Treitschke, who 
described British maritime policy as that of “privileged rapine,” wrote that an 
international balance of power “was not secure, so long as one single state could act upon 
all the seas in accordance with her own arbitrary caprice.”*'*̂ At the peace negotiations 
following Napoleon’s defeat, both Russia and Prussia campaigned for “the principles of a 
humane sea power which could not be oppressive to neutral trade,” but Great Britain 
opposed their efforts because she felt “that this would threaten the very basis of her 
power.”*"̂  ̂Ultimately, the continental powers’ preoccupation with more pressing 
problems meant that “the foulest spot of modem international law was not touched upon 
during the peace negotiations of Chatillon, Paris, and Vienna.”*'̂ '* This conclusion of the 
debate about maritime law represented for Treitschke yet another example of Britain 
exploiting her insular position to protect her own interests and world empire.
Treitschke’s treatment of George Canning, appointed foreign secretary upon 
Castlereagh’s death in 1822, serves as another telling example of his interpretation of 
British policy in general. According to Treitschke, Canning continued Britain’s single- 
minded policy of securing commercial gains; with his appointment to office “a resolute
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representative of English interests and English commercial poliey once again acquired a 
predominant influence in Downing Street.” “From his youth upwards,” wrote Treitschke, 
“Canning had lived solely for the idea of England’s power.” "̂̂  ̂ The historian argued that 
Canning, rather than recognizing the French Revolution as a profound ideological 
struggle, saw it only as “a contest for the British mastery of the sea.” '"̂  ̂ In order to cover 
up his true commercial aims. Canning often appealed to the liberal and national 
aspirations of continental Europeans:
The fine phrases about national freedom introduced into his speeches were to serve only 
as a means by which the approval o f  public opinion on the continent was to be won on 
behalf o f the harsh commercial policy o f  England.*'*’
Treitschke’s Anglophobia skewed his history to such an extent that he even 
attempted to portray the British abolition of the slave trade as an attempt to expand 
British commercial interests. He wrote that British statesmen supported abolition “with 
an ardour that was altogether too conspicuous, while the British commercial world used 
language of almost fanatical vehemence against the slave traders.”*'** Treitschke 
attempted to account for this alleged enthusiasm with an explanation of the trade in 
coffee. He noted that “barely one-twentieth” of all coffee imports came from English 
possessions and that British colonies already “had long been overstocked with blacks.”*'*̂ 
For those reasons, the cessation of the slave trade could do little harm to British 
commerce, but “it would inevitably give rise to severe economic disturbances in the 
colonies of the other naval powers.”*̂® Treitschke concluded that all the “flne talk of
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Christian brotherly love” simply masked the true aims of British policy—namely, 
commercial interests. * ̂  ̂
In order to challenge Britain’s world hegemony, Treitschke advocated a vigorous 
policy of colonial expansion. He conceded that Germany had missed a great opportunity 
for colonization, as much of the globe had already been claimed by the British: “The 
consequences of the last half century have been appalling, for in them England has 
conquered the world.”^̂  ̂ In light of this development, Treitschke viewed colonial 
expansion as absolutely necessary to the future of the German nation, writing that “the 
whole position of Germany depends upon the number of German-speaking millions in the 
future.” ^̂  ̂ He proclaimed that “all great nations” have pursued an impulse “to set their 
mark upon barbarian lands.” Furthermore, “The colonizing impulse has become a vital 
question for a great nation.”^̂  ̂ Treitschke passionately encouraged Germany to take her 
rightful place among the great colonizing nations of the world:
every colonizing effort which retains its single nationality has become a factor of  
immense importance for the future o f the world. Upon it depends the share which each 
people will take in the domination o f the earth by the white races.
Such a policy of imperial expansion would almost surely lead any nation into war, 
a risk that Treitschke welcomed. He accepted and even celebrated the fact that 
international relations, when perceived as a continuous struggle of nations, necessarily 
entailed wars among states. While he argued that the political and military reforms of 
men such as Frederick and Stein had made great contributions to German national unity 
and the growth of a common national sentiment, Treitschke strongly believed that war
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had even greater ability to unite a people. For that reason, Treitschke celebrated the 
experience of war throughout his works.
The national historian insisted that states and nations built and strengthened 
themselves through conflict. Throughout history conflict had worked to unite nations. 
This trend could be traced back to ancient tribal peoples, among whom “[t]he gregarious 
instinct.. .was strengthened as much by the impulse of hostility to the alien as by the other 
impulse of adherence to the tribe to which a man belonged.”^̂  ̂ Treitschke untiringly 
argued that war benefited states and nations: “it is war which turns a people into a 
nation."^ In his Politics the nationalist historian wrote, “We leam from history that 
nothing knits a nation more closely together than war.. .War and conquest, then, are the 
most important factors in state construction.” '̂  ̂ War functions as “the one remedy for an 
ailing nation.”'̂  ̂ Treitschke shamelessly celebrated the “grandeur of war,” which 
“[annihilates].. .puny man in the great conception of the State.”'^"
In his analysis of the Prussian Wars of Liberation against Napoleon’s forces, 
Treitschke revealed his view of war as a constructive force in the nation-building process. 
The historian celebrated the work of General Gebhart Blücher, who commanded Prussian 
forces at the Battle of Katzbach, which freed Silesia from French control. Treitschke 
approvingly noted Blucher’s “joy of battle,” and his brilliant victory, which “awakened 
what is absolutely essential to every national war, a delight in a national hero...Blücher’s 
name was in every mouth.”'^' The emaneipation of Berlin produced a similar effect on
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the national consciousness:
What bursts o f  joy and sorrow; there was no end to expressions o f  thankfulness and to 
embracing; in a thousand moving lineaments was displayed the holy power o f  love which 
a just war awakens in noble nations.
Such an interpretation of the Wars of Liberation may not be entirely accurate. 
David Blackboum argues that “the ‘war of national liberation’ described by later 
nationalists was largely a legend.” He notes that attempts to petition the German nation 
“met with widespread indifference.” High rates of desertion also indicate the lack of 
national enthusiasm on the part of the soldiers. Blackboum finally concludes, “There 
was no spontaneous Pmssian uprising in 1813, let alone a German-wide movement.. .The 
role of the volunteer detachments was exaggerated by nationalist historiography.” ̂
The creation of the German Confederation destroyed any hopes of a peaceful 
political integration of Germany; now the ideal of a German nation could only be realized 
through war. “The new Germany,” wrote Treitschke, “could be created only with the aid 
of the sword.” *̂ '̂  He did, though, see a silver lining to this dismal situation. While the 
Germanic Confederation effectively stifled the German national movement and kept the 
German states in a subordinate position to Austria, it failed “to prevent the increase in 
strength of the one really living German state.” That state—Pmssia, of course—“was 
destined at a later date to destroy that Federation, and to bestow upon our unhappy nation 
a new and worthy order.”’^̂  Yet again, Treitschke had made the mistake of suggesting 
that the German Reich of 1871 had been the historical objective of Pmssian statesmen.
Ibid., 565.
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VI. Conclusion
Throughout his career as a historian, Heinrich von Treitschke committed what 
David Hackett Fischer has called simply the “historian’s fallacy,” namely the mistake of 
portraying the moves of past actors as consciously working to achieve present reality.
In other words, “this fallacy consists in the tendency of historians, with their retrospective 
advantages, to forget that their subjects did not know what was coming next.”’^̂  This 
particular fallacy points up the central flaw of Treitschke’s work. Whether they were 
acting in 1670 or 1870, Treitschke maintained that all Prussian statesmen sought German 
national unification when, in fact, their actions were usually not motivated by desires for 
German unity. For instance, Treitschke could look back on the work of Motz and the 
creation of the Zollverein and argue that it was a conscious move toward unification. The 
reality, of course, was that Motz was not concerned with national unity at all, even 
though in retrospect the customs union had provided a useful framework for unification 
in 1866 and 1870.
Despite the fallaciousness of Treitschke’s history and its historical inaccuracy—or 
probably because of it—the effect of his works was to create a coherent national mission 
for Germany. Through his German History he constructed a German past that celebrated 
the role of the Prussian state in defending and promoting the interests of the German 
people and working to achieve German national unity. This mission was often 
accomplished in the face of opposition from Austria, France, and Britain. Treitschke also 
presented Prussia—and later Germany—as the defender of religious and intellectual
David Hackett Fischer, Historians ’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic o f  Historical Thought (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1970), 209.
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freedom. This Protestant land was a haven from the spiritual tyranny of Rome and the 
overweening domination of Austria.
Of course, when Treitschke wrote his History and delivered his lectures on 
politics, German political unity had already been achieved. This development did not 
make the message of his History obsolete, though. He intended his compatriots to adopt 
the Prussian mission as their own, strengthening their national state and asserting 
Germany as a world power. Treitschke wanted Germany to become a leader of 
humanity, a “new Israel.” This call did not go unnoticed. Treitschke’s History was 
widely read in late nineteenth-century Germany and many shared the historian’s 
enthusiasm for state power, imperial expansion, and war.
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CHAPTER THREE
FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDTS USE OF 
TREITSCHKE FOR HISTORICAL AUTHORITY
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Treitschke enjoyed tremendous popularity as both a lecturer and a publicist. His 
widely read German History went through several editions. The ideas Treitschke 
presented had a significant impact on many Germans and the way they thought about 
their nation. Friedrich von Bemhardi, who was the first Prussian soldier to ride under the 
Arc de Triomphe in 1871, “swinging his sabre [as] he led his squad of horse” through the 
French national monument,* was one German whom Treitschke’s national mission had 
greatly infiueneed. After beginning his career in the Prussian army in 1869, Bemhardi 
had served in the German military in various capacities until his first retirement in 1909. 
With the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 he came out of retirement to serve during the 
First World War.^ Throughout his career he had made a name for himself publishing 
books on military theory, but in the years prior to the Great War Bemhardi also published 
several highly politicized works calling on Germans to assert themselves as a great world 
power. These works revealed his enthusiasm for a radical policy of imperial expansion 
and militarism.
Bemhardi’s extreme views have attracted the attention of many scholars of 
political science and intemational relations, who have attempted to analyze the German 
general’s theories of nationalism, imperialism, and militarism. Mike Hawkins has 
classified Bemhardi’s theories as unmistakably social Darwinist, arguing that he 
“inferred the inevitability of conflict from the pressure of population on resourees.”  ̂
While Bemhardi’s work closely resembled that of Treitschke, Hawkins rightly points out 
that “Bemhardi went beyond Treitsehke to argue that the interests of the nation-state had
' Loren K. Campion, As Bismarck Fell: The Restive Mind o f  the German Military (Greenville, NC: East 
Carolina University Press, 1976), 50.
 ̂Walther Killy, “Friedrich von Bemhardi,” Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopddie (München: K.G. Saur, 
1995) 1:469.
 ̂Hawkins, 208.
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to be understood within the context of biological imperatives.”'* Paul Crook agrees that 
Bemhardi's work, with its arguments for the “biological necessity” o f war and 
imperialism, had a distinct Darwinian component.^
Another scholar has classified Bemhardi's worldview as both “hierarchic realist,” 
a classification that “postulates that nations live in a state of conflictual super- and 
subordination,” and “militaristic imperialism,” a fairly self-explanatory category.® 
Hierarchic realists, explains Jürg Martin Gabriel, reject the existence of an equilibrium of 
approximately equal states and instead view intemational relations as an endless stmggle 
for hegemony. They accept war as an unavoidable and even desirable feature of 
intemational life. For these theorists war possesses a positive moral value and is viewed 
as an end in itself rather than a means to some other end. Hierarchic realist theorists also 
tend to view history and intemational relations as cyclical, with strong actors rising to 
hegemony as their competitors decline, and so on.^
All of these observers have underscored that Bemhardi encouraged Germany to 
rise to hegemony in Europe and eventually in the world by a policy of imperial 
expansion. To further that end he advocated war as a positive and, indeed, a necessary 
exercise in his nation’s stmggle for world power. Bemhardi’s work had a strongly 
Anglophobic component. For Germany, an impending hegemonic showdown with Great 
Britain was inevitable.
Gabriel has observed that Bemhardi’s philosophy of idealism saw in man a need 
for spiritual and moral development, not simply material comfort. Bemhardi often
Hawkins, 209.
 ̂Crook, 82-83.
 ̂Jürg Martin Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories o f  International Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
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juxtaposed his conception of idealism to Anglo-Saxon materialism, which he viewed as a 
shallow and single-minded pursuit of material gain.* Like Treitschke, Bemhardi saw a 
need for a strong state that could stand above the masses, mitigating differences among 
interest groups and cultivating the nation’s moral fiber.
These radical ideas were presented in a number of widely read books that 
Bemhardi published during his first retirement from 1909 to 1914, except for one essay 
published in 1890. These works, namely Videant Consules (1890), Germany and the 
Next War (1912), and Our Future—A Word o f Warning to the German Nation (1912), 
closely mirrored the doctrines presented by the national historian Heinrich von 
Treitschke, whom he frequently cited, particularly his German History and his Politics. 
Treitschke undoubtedly had an impact on the intellectual development of Bemhardi, but 
more than anything the General could rely on the historian to provide legitimacy for his 
own radical ideas. By including the ideas, and indeed the very words, of Treitschke in 
his own works, Bemhardi added a degree of “scientific” authority to his own theories of 
intemational relations and Germany’s national mission.
In his intellectual development, Bemhardi was strongly influenced by his father 
Theodor von Bemhardi. Although hom in Berlin on Febmary 6, 1803, the elder 
Bemhardi grew up under Tsarist control in Estonia. In part due to his inability to 
advance within the Russian bureaucracy and his failure to secure a position at the 
Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, Theodor emigrated to Germany in 1851 and 
eventually settled at Kunnersdorf in Silesia. Probably as a result of his professional 
frustrations, Bemhardi developed vehemently anti-Russian sentiments. Loren Campion 
observes that “[b]y the year 1851 he already felt so convinced of a coming showdown
* Gabriel, 44,
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between Germandom and Slavdom that he left the Tsarist Empire in order that his two 
sons would not have to fight on the Russian side.”^
After settling in Prussia, Theodor made a name for himself as a writer, publishing 
several highly acclaimed historical and political works. In 1854, in the midst of the 
Crimean War, Bemhardi traveled to Warsaw to get a sense of the political situation in the 
Russian Empire and wrote “Russia in March and April 1854” upon his return to Prussia. 
The memorandum made the rounds among the Prussian political elite, finally reaching 
the hands of Prince William, the future King William 1, who was impressed by the 
work.̂ *̂  The following year Bemhardi produced “Russia as Nicholas 1 Leaves It,” which 
made an even greater impression than his first memo. A biographical study of Carl 
Friedrich von Toll, an allied general-quartermaster at the Battle of Dresden in 1813, in 
1856 brought Bemhardi literary renown and gained him access to Berlin high society."
In 1863 he drafted “On the Polish Uprising of 1863.”"  In 1881 he wrote two volumes 
entitled Frederick the Great as a Military CommanderP
Theodor von Bemhardi’s writings revealed all of the Russophobic biases that he 
harbored in his personal life. Campion provides some valuable insight into the writings 
of Bemhardi, noting that in his work on Toll—which was essentially a military history of 
the years 1812-1814— the author gave Pmssia's role in the Wars of Liberation a “forceful 
shove into the foreground.”"  He lauded the actions of Pmssians and ethnic Germans, 
while downplaying the contributions of General Kutuzov and other Russians. Of
® Campion, 40-41.
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particular importance in Bemhardi’s interpretation was the Livonian-German general 
Michael Barelay de Tolly. “Bemhardi went so far as to give the Livonian chief credit for 
saving the Tsar’s army from destmction at Borodino,” explains Campion. “In faet [he] 
designated him as the hero of Borodino purely and simply” *̂  Bemhardi’s other writings 
and the records of his conversations continued along these lines, criticizing Russian 
society and revealing their author’s anti-Russian inclinations.^^
With his literary suceess, Theodor von Bemhardi quickly rose to the top of 
Prussian society and socialized with many of the state’s elite, ineluding the crown prince 
and prineess. Field Marshall von Moltke, and the historian Heinrich von Treitschke. 
Bemhardi was indeed popular and influential as a publicist, but despite all his aeclaim he 
attraeted some notable critics. Both Bismarck and the novelist and eritie Gustav Freytag, 
a close friend of Treitschke, failed to share the great admiration of Bemhardi that so 
many other Germans had. Freytag had a low opinion of his Russian history and was also 
repelled by his apparent egotism.'* Bismarck acknowledged Bemhardi’s eontributions as 
a military writer, but offered some seathing eriticism of the author’s work:
He writes agreeably and as for a feuilleton, but when I go through his closely, minutely, 
and ornamentally written reports, there is really nothing there, what with all their 
lengthiness.
In spite of his opinion of Bemhardi’s works, the chancellor apparently recognized some 
talent in the man. In 1866 Bemhardi served as a representative of Bismarek in Italy and 
was also active diplomatieally in Italy and in Spain until 1871. Theodor von Bemhardi 
died in Kunnersdorf on Febmary 12, 1887.^"
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Theodor’s son, Friedrich von Bemhardi, was according to Campion an “Even 
Harder Chip Off the Old Block,” *̂ a fitting characterization considering the even more 
intense German chauvinism of the younger Bemhardi, who shared his father’s 
Russophobia. Over time, though, Friedrich von Bemhardi began to see England, not 
Russia, as Germany’s tme rival in her rise as a world power. In the years leading up to 
World War I, Bemhardi’s works revealed an intense Anglophobia as he attempted to rally 
Germans to oppose British designs around the globe.
Bom on September 22, 1849, in Petersburg, Friedrich von Bemhardi grew up on 
his father’s manor in Silesia and was educated in Berlin. In 1869 he became an officer in 
the Fourteenth Hussar Regiment in Kassel. During the Franco-Pmssian War he fought in 
the Battle of Worth, receiving the Iron Cross for his performance. Although not active at 
Sedan, Bemhardi did have the previously mentioned honor of being the first Pmssian 
soldier to pass through the Arc de Triomphe.
After the war, Bemhardi continued his career in the military. In 1872 he joined 
the Fifth Dragoons in Frankfurt and that same year entered the War Academy in Berlin. 
While in Berlin in the 1870s Bemhardi made the acquaintance of Treitschke and 
Droysen, two men whom he credited in his memoirs “for a large part of [his] 
education.”^̂  In 1879 he was appointed to the Grand General Staff’s Topographical 
Department and in 1882 sent to Greece with orders to map the southem part of Attica for 
the Greeks. In 1883 Bemhardi retumed to the Grand General Staff to direct a surveying 
department. 1886 witnessed Bemhardi’s appointment to the German army’s 15*
Killy, “Theodor von Bemhardi,” Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopadie I: 470.20
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Division at Cologne; 1888 saw his move to Düsseldorf as squadron chief of the 5* 
Uhlans?'̂
Like his father before him, literary skills won Friedrich von Bemhardi 
considerable acclaim and admiration. In 1890, writing on behalf of the General Staff, he 
penned Videant Consules, Ne Quid Respublica Detrimenti Capiat, which appeared 
anonymously in German bookstores in spring of that year.^^ Appearing in the wake of 
Bismarck’s retirement as chancellor, the pamphlet reflected the strongly anti-Russian 
sentiments of the German General Staff and the anti-Bismarckian faction in the Imperial 
government. Led by Count Alfred von Waldersee, this group sensationalized the threat 
of a concerted Franco-Russian attack on Germany and advocated a preventive war 
against these enemies.^^
In Videant Consules Bemhardi’s chauvinism shined through. The overriding 
message of the work was one of impending battle with threatening “Slavdom” in the 
East. Bemhardi wamed that Russia “[was] preparing itself methodically and 
energetically for an aggressive war against Germany” and that “all circumstances [in 
Russia] press for an offensive war.”^̂  The writer alerted his audience to the dangerous 
menace of Pan-Slavism, which “recognizes its greatest adversary in newly-strengthened 
Teutondom, which today is the chief torchbearer of all traly humanitarian cultural 
efforts.” Bemhardi observed among the Pan-Slavists “a profound national hatred for 
Germany and everything German.” He saw war as inevitable and unavoidable: “Pan-
Campion, 50-51.
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Slavism must by nature press for war, as expansion is its condition for existence.” *̂
The author’s hierarchic realist worldview is apparent. In Videant Consules 
Bemhardi reminded Germans that they must increase their political influence and spread 
their culture and revealed his militarist imperialist approach to intemational relations as 
well as his debt to Treitschke. “For a great people like ourselves cannot renounce 
dissemination of its culture,” wrote Bemhardi,
[and] a gradual enlargement o f  its spheres o f  interest and influence. It cannot at all 
escape doing those things without retrogressing in its political and historical importance.
This we can leam on every page o f world history.
Bemhardi went so far as to insist that it was Germany’s cultural mission to battle with
Russia: “we too will again resume our age-old cultural mission against Slavdom, and in
so doing will clash with the latter’s need to expand.” *̂̂ “[The] Battle of German
Teutonism against Pan-Slavism,” wrote Bemhardi, “that will be the hallmark of the next
historical epoch.” ’̂ Bemhardi argued that all of Germany’s political resources must be
concentrated on the task of the impending showdown with Russia:
our whole policy must be home by the fundamental concept o f  settling accounts and 
reaching an understanding with France, in order to be able to throw all the vital forces o f  
the nation into the balance for the great Teutonie cultural missions against Russia.
Videant Consules revealed Bemhardi’s attitude toward war as a sometimes
necessary and even beneficial phenomenon in human development. He argued that
“individualism, the formation of states, the separate development of nations” achieve a
“higher meaning” only when “those endeavors contend together in the great contest for
Ibid., 77.
Ibid., 125-126. 
Ibid., 126. 
Ibid., 127.
Ibid.
91
the highest goals of the human race.”^̂  Furthermore, “it is the moral and historical duty 
of the state to intervene with all its might.” The state can intervene “through the peaceful 
competition of toil, but when circumstances call for it, with the sword.” The state must 
fight “for the ideas and ideals which appear to it...as necessary requisites for progress.” 
Finally, Bemhardi stated that war “is also one of the most necessary requisites of all 
human progress, and as such in some circumstances is a moral obligation.
At the time of the publication of Videant Consules ’ Bemhardi also experimented 
in spiritism and “dabbled in the occult,” allegedly practicing telepathy with a fellow 
officer’s wife.^^ It was a revealing aspect of his personality that may partly explain his 
almost mystical belief in the creative and rejuvenating aspects of war, his glorification of 
the state, and utter rejection of materialism. Bemhardi had married Armgard von 
Klitzing in 1881, who died in the summer of 1890. Campion suggests that “[t]his last 
event helped shove him farther still in the direction of occultism and preoccupation with 
life beyond the grave.”^̂  The General began frequenting Berlin mystics and “[h]is long­
standing interest in thought- and will-transference, second-sight, and Doppelgangerei, 
etc., now intensified.”^̂
After the publication of Videant Consules, Bemhardi made a number of career 
moves. In 1891 he was appointed German military attaché in Bem. After a failed 
attempt to transfer to Turkey, Bemhardi married Fraulein von Colomb in 1893 and was 
appointed commander of the Baden Body-Dragoons Regiment No. 20 in Karlsmhe. In 
1897 he became chief of the General Staff of the XVIth Army Corps at Metz. Very
”  Ibid., 135-136.
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shortly thereafter he took charge of the Military History Department of the Grand 
General Staff, where he worked for three years until 1900. Following his stint as a 
historian, the General accepted several other military appointments, climbing nearly to 
the top of the German army . In 1909, then 60 years old and in bad health, he retired from 
active duty.^*
During this time Bemhardi continued to write, publishing two very important 
theoretical works: Cavalry in Future Wars (1899) and Cavalry in War and Peace 
(1910).^^ These two works brought him wide acclaim as a military theorist. The General 
had portrayed the American Civil War as “the best model for the future use of cavalry” 
and his theories were especially well received in the United Sta tes .Despi te  the 
dramatic changes that modem technology had wrought on modem warfare, Bemhardi 
still believed that the cavalry represented a valuable unit of any army. In fact, Antonio 
Echevarria observes, “Bemhardi believed that the deadliness of tactical means had only 
increased the strategic value of cavalry.”"̂ ' In particular, he argued that cavalry could be 
especially useful for several kinds of operations. First, armies could take advantage of 
cavalry “to execute more long-range or strategic reconnaissance missions.”'̂  ̂ Secondly, 
because modem warfare would increase the length and importance of lines of 
communication, as the immensity o f armies eliminated the possibility of “[living] off the 
land,” “cavalry should execute raids more frequently against the enemy’s lines of
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communication and s u p p l y . H e  believed that Germany would not only faee the new 
challenges of modem military technology, but that Germany’s opponents would also be 
“more determined and capable” than they had been in 1870-71
Bemhardi’s publieations in the immediate prewar years demonstrated most 
clearly the influence of Treitsehke upon his thought, as well as his use of Treitschke to 
give his theories a higher degree of seientifie authority. Bemhardi eited Treitsehke in 
varying degrees in these publications, extensively in some and not at all in others, but the 
eore ideas of Treitschke’s thoughts are clearly evident in all of these works. As Gabriel 
writes, “reekless militarism and their glorifieation of war” are what join Bemhardi and 
Treitschke. Moreover, the nationalistic aspects of Treitschke’s works were most clearly 
refleeted in Bemhardi’s Germany and the Next War (1912), Our Future—A Word o f  
Warning to the German Nation (1912), and On War o f  Today (1912). These publications 
mirrored Treitschke’s German chauvinism, veneration of the state, Anglophobia, imperial 
enthusiasm, and strong belief in the benefits and moral value of war.
It is in Germany and the Next War (1912) that Bemhardi most obviously relied on 
Treitschke both as an inspiration and as an authority.'*^ Carlton Hayes eorrectly observes, 
“Bemhardi cites Treitsehke no less than twenty times within a hundred pages and utilizes 
his phrases as texts about whieh to eonstmct elaborate theories of imperialism and 
militarism.”'̂  ̂ In this book the German general set for himself the same task that 
Treitschke had adopted roughly four decades earlier—to “most effectually rouse the
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national feeling in my readers’ hearts, and strengthen the national purpose.”'*̂  The 
practical consequences of Bemhardi’s book remain uncertain, but Paul Kennedy 
maintains that in 1912 Germany and the Next War, along with the president of the Pan- 
German League Heinrich Class’s Wenn ich der Kaiser war, was one of the country’s 
“two political ‘best-sellers.’”'*̂  Gabriel notes that the book was “an immediate 
sensation.”'*̂
The ideas Bemhardi presented in Germany and the Next War represent a prime 
example of what Gabriel calls “militaristic imperialism” in international relations theory. 
In fact, Gabriel presents Bemhardi as his only model for this approach to international 
politics, although it seems that Treitschke would make an equally appropriate model for 
this classification as well. The most pervasive and profound theme of Germany and the 
Next War is that the pre-World War I peace of Europe was not beneficial. Rather, it was 
a hindrance to the healthy development of national life. As Gabriel points out, Bemhardi 
begins his book with an indictment of Kant’s Perpetual Peaee, claiming that it unjustly 
convinced many of the general’s contemporaries “that war is the destmction of all good 
and the origin of all evil.” *̂* He chastised the Germans’ for their alleged “strongly- 
marked love of peace,” which he blamed in part on the materialism of the masses, who 
did not wish to disrapt their commercial life.^* He wrote that German political power 
was “fettered” by this “love of peace,” which “threaten[s] to poison the souls of the 
German people.”^̂  Finally, this ubiquitous desire for peace must be extinguished, for
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“the maintenance of peace never can or may be the goal of a poliey.”^̂
Obviously, the alternative to peace is war, which was exactly what Bemhardi 
wanted for his nation. In the first two chapters of his book, titled “The Right to Make 
War” and “The Duty to Make War,” the author attempted to prove the necessity of war 
by arguing that it was an inevitable and desirable aspect of nature and the relations 
among nations. Bemhardi’s discussion of war revealed the social Darwinist element in 
his thought. He asserted that “[w]ar is a biological necessity” and “the father of all 
things.” '̂* It has “destmctive as well as creative and purifying power. War, unlike 
peace, had the ability to “arouse national life and to expand national power [more] than 
any other means known to history,”^̂  an argument made by Treitschke before him but 
without the Darwinian basis that Bemhardi included. Bemhardi attempted to give war a 
deep cultural significance, asserting that it represented “an indispensable factor of 
culture, in which a tme civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and 
vitality.”^̂  He assigned moral value to war and called it “a moral necessity, if it is waged 
to protect the highest and most valuable interests of a nation.” *̂
In his analysis of the drawbacks of peace and the virtues of war, Bemhardi drew 
on Treitschke to bolster his argument. He included several quotations from Treitschke’s 
Politics and his German History that lent some legitimacy to his extreme statements. In 
regard to the undesirability of peace he included Treitschke’s statement that “[i]t has 
always been the weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages which have played with the dream
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of perpetual peace.”^̂  He also cited Treitschke to reinforce his statements on war: “God 
will see to it that war always recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race."^^ In 
another instance he quoted the historian to ‘prove’ that war held an unmatched positive 
value: “A thousand touching traits testify to the sacred power of the love which a 
righteous war awakes in noble nations.”^̂
In Germany and the Next War, Bemhardi also blatantly appealed to the German 
nation to increase the power of the state, an ideal undoubtedly borrowed directly from 
Treitschke. Bemhardi assigned moral value to this task, for the state “cannot attain its 
great moral ends unless its political power increases.” The state ultimately exists for the 
benefit of mankind: “[I]t is only the State which strives after an enlarged sphere of 
influence that creates the conditions under which mankind develops into the most 
splendid p e r f e c t i o n . T h e  national state should exist as a high authority standing above 
the straggling masses “not merely to protect, but actively to promote, the moral and 
spiritual interests of society.”^̂  In a state that fails to enhance its power or even loses 
power, “its citizens become stunted.” ̂  In order to protect its power and other “higher 
interests,” the state must not only possess the requisite power, but also increase its power. 
For Bemhardi that was “the first and foremost duty of the State.”^̂  The General offered a 
very pessimistic view of human nature—man cannot perfect himself by his own efforts, 
so he requires a strong state to promote his intellectual and moral development.^^
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Bemhardi the propagandist relied on Treitschke the historian to provide 
legitimacy and authority to his theories of the state, its duties, and its powers. Both 
shared the same notions of the state’s moral duties and responsibilities. As Treitschke 
wrote, “The State is a moral community It is called upon to educate the human race by 
positive achievement, and its ultimate object is that a nation should develop in it and 
through it into [sic] a real character; that is, alike for nation and individuals, the highest 
moral task.”^̂  Like Treitschke before him, Bemhardi also voiced his debt to Maehiavelli, 
“the first to declare that the keynote of every policy was the advancement of power.” For 
Maehiavelli, though, the state should seek to solidify and enhance its power simply as an 
end in itself. It was Treitschke who qualified power as a means to moral ends: “power 
must justify itself by being applied to the greatest good of mankind.” *̂ Bemhardi 
acknowledged his debt to Treitschke for this idea; “I have thought it impossible to 
explain the foundations of political morality better than in the words of our great national 
historian.”^̂
Bemhardi’s synthesis of militarism, imperialism, and state power constituted what 
he called “idealism.” He railed against shallow materialism. For him man was a moral 
being who could not be satisfied by mere material comforts: man’s “final purpose does 
not rest on enjoyment, but on the development of intellectual and moral powers.” *̂̂ 
According to Bemhardi, materialistic nations like the British were inherently weak and 
thus sought to maintain peace. By contrast, strong states do not fear wars that cultivate 
morality. “It is political idealism which calls for war,” wrote Bemhardi, “while
Treitschke, quoted in F. v Bemhardi, Germany and the Next War, 25.
^  Treitschke, Politik 2: 28, quoted in F. v. Bemhardi, Germany and the Next War, 46. 
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materialism—in theory, at least—repudiates it.”^’ Bemhardi found support for his 
idealism in a passage from Treitschke’s Politics'.
War is elevating, because the individual disappears before the great conception o f the 
State. The devotion o f the members o f a community to each other is nowhere so 
splendidly conspicuous as in war.. .What a perversion o f morality to wish to abolish 
heroism among men!^^
Bemhardi associated militarism, war, and a powerful state, with his conception of 
idealism, while “[l]iberal individualism [was] put on the same footing as materialism, 
egoism, weakness and peace.” As for his view of British society, it was “quite common 
in Germany at the time.”^̂
In Germany and the Next War Bemhardi also argued for the historical and 
cultural mission of Germany as the leader of civilization. In his chapter “Germany’s 
Historical Mission,” Bemhardi offered a chauvinistic interpretation of German history 
and culture. He made reckless claims about Germany’s invaluable contributions to world 
civilization, at one point writing, “a high, if  not the highest, importance for the entire 
development of the human race is ascribable to this German people.” "̂* He portrayed 
Germany as the guardian of intellectual freedom, describing the Reformation as a 
German crasade against the “intellectual yoke, imposed by the Church, which checked all 
free progress.” Also vital to the “intellectual and moral progress of man” was the 
intellectual movement of “the Critique of Pure Reason,” the work of Kant that rightly 
“pointed out the way knowledge is really possible.”^̂
Like Treitschke, Bemhardi looked to the German past to support his claims about 
Germany’s mission. In Germany and the Next War, he noted that Frederick the Great
F. V Bemhardi, Germany and the Next War, 26, quoted in Gabriel, 44.
Treitschke, Politik 1: 74, quoted in F. v. Bemhardi, Germany and the Next War, 28. 
Gabriel, 44.
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“recognized the ennobling effects of war,” and he viewed the Wars of Liberation as 
having a great unifying effect on the German people/^ Bemhardi supported his theories 
of war with historical examples, arguing that Frederick’s conquest of Silesia was 
significant for Germany only because it was obtained by “a war of unparalleled heroism,” 
rather than by peaceful means of arbitration/^ It was Frederick the Great who astutely 
realized that “it had become essential to enlarge the territory of the State,” if  Prussia was 
to survive in its precarious position in Central Europe/* Bemhardi also celebrated the 
efforts of Schamhorst, who “grasped the idea of universal military service,” and of Stein, 
who “laid the foundations of self government in Prassia.”^̂  The author credited Kant for 
teaching “the gospel of moral duty” and for contributing to “a revolution of duty'' 
whereas the French had experienced an inferior revolution of'‘‘rights” which ultimately 
led to “individual irresponsibility and to a repudiation of the State.”*̂
Bemhardi also assigned to Germany “duties of the greatest importance for the 
whole advance of human civilization.”*̂  In order to meet her responsibility as the leader 
of world civilization, Germany must expand her intemational political power. “[T]he 
German nation,” wrote Bemhardi, “from the standpoint of its importance to civilization, 
is fully entitled not only to demand a place in the sun.. .but to aspire to an adequate share 
in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the limits of its present sphere of influence.”*̂  
He eontended that if  Germany was to compete with the other Great Powers she “must not
Ibid., 27. 
Ibid., 34. 
Ibid., 41.
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hold back in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world.”*̂  He wanted to “stamp a 
great part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit.”*'*
To become a world power, Bemhardi argued that Germany must pursue a 
determined policy of overseas conquest and colonization. In addition to solidifying her 
position within Europe, “an extension of our colonial possessions.. .must be the basis of 
[Germany’s] future development.”*̂  Germany must expand her colonial possessions in 
order to rise to world power status. If she did not, history proves that she would 
inevitably decline. This type of cyclical interpretation of history was common at the 
time, not only in Germany. Gabriel explains.
It was particularly fashionable to personalize the life o f  nations, to think o f them as 
having been bom, then reaching maturity and manhood, and finally growing old and 
beginning to decline. Such ideas prevailed in many countries and were not a specifically 
German invention.*®
According to this view. Great Britain had reached its age of decline. Now it was 
Germany’s turn to reach “manhood” and assert itself as a world power.
Throughout his discussion of Germany’s historical mission, Bemhardi inserted 
salient passages from Treitschke’s Politics and German History. In his Politics 
Treitschke proclaimed that “it is quite imaginable that a eountry which owns no colonies 
will no longer count among the European Great Powers, however powerful it may 
otherwise be.”*̂  A statement from Germany and the Next War appears as if  it was lifted 
directly out of Treitschke’s Politics: “In the future.. .the importance of Germany will rest 
on two points; firstly, how many millions of men in the world speak German? Secondly,
Ibid., 79.
Ibid., 114.
Ibid., 85.
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how many of them are politically members of the German Empire?” In his Politics 
Treitschke had asserted “that the whole position of Germany depends on the number of 
German-speaking millions in the future.”*̂
Finally, Germany and the Next War revealed Bemhardi’s vehement Anglophobia, 
which may have developed from his realization that Great Britain’s world empire and 
powerful navy stood in the way of German colonial development. He claimed that 
England had historically sought to maintain a balance of power on the Continent “to 
prevent any one of [the nations of Europe] attaining a pronounced supremacy.” While 
the continental nations at times occupied one another, England was able to build its 
“world Empire” unopposed. In light of this, argued Bemhardi, “England’s aim must be 
to repress Germany, but strengthen France.”^̂  He wamed of an attack from France in the 
event of an Anglo-German confrontation. To prevent such an attack, “France must be so 
completely crushed that she can never again come across our path.” ’̂ He later wrote, 
“[English policy] doubtless wishes, by all and every means, even the most extreme, to 
hinder every further expansion of German intemational influence and of German 
maritime power.
Maritime power was a major concem of Bemhardi’s. He devoted an entire 
chapter of his book to “The Next Naval War,” which he believed would inevitably “be 
waged with England.”^̂  He did not argue that Germany must necessarily cmsh England 
and rise to world dominance. Rather, he was concemed primarily with Germany’s rise to
F.v. Bemhardi, Germany and the Next War, 83. 
Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics 1: 118.
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world power status, which theoretically could happen in concert with Britain or without 
her. He considered the chances of this happening peacefully and in cooperation with 
England, but concluded that it would more likely happen unilaterally through war. He 
did not instruct Germany to conquer, destroy, or dominate England. He did maintain, 
however, that Germany must somehow reckon with the British if she were to achieve her 
rightful place among the powers of the world. In the ensuing war with England, he 
wrote, “we must conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to be defeated, for it will 
decide whether we can attain a position as a World Power by the side of, and in spite of, 
E n g lan d .A cco rd in g  to Bemhardi, Germany’s reckoning with England would benefit 
not only the Reich, but the entire world; he portrayed the Germans as crusaders against 
England for the intemational freedom of the seas.^^
In 1913, a year after the publication of Germany and the Next War, Bemhardi’s 
Our Future—A Word o f  Warning to the German Nation appeared in German bookstores. 
J. Ellis Barker, the work’s English translator, gave it the provocative title “Britain as 
Germany’s Vassal,” and correctly observed that it “is more popular in tone” than 
Bemhardi’s earlier work.^^ Our Future was offered for only one-fifth the price, had a 
wider readership, and made a greater impact on the German public than had Germany 
and the Next War.^^ In his preface to the English edition Barker maintained that Our 
Future “urges Germany to acquire by war first the supremacy in Europe and the 
Mediterranean, and then the mastery of the world.” *̂ Barker clearly intended to stir up
^Ibid., 164.
Ibid., 165.
^  J. Ellis Barker in his preface to F v. Bemhardi, Britain as Germany’s Vassal, translated by J. Ellis Barker 
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anti-German sentiment with his translation of Bemhardi’s book and his title and various 
aspects of his introduction are certainly overstated. Still, his assessment of the work is 
basically accurate, although Bemhardi did not call for German “mastery” of the world, 
but rather her emergence as a world power among other powers. Throughout the book 
Bemhardi presented his audience with an existential dilemma; “The question which calls 
for an answer is whether Germany is to become a world-Power or is destined to decline.” 
Bemhardi gave a clear answer: “[Germany] is a world-Power which is able and entitled 
to give Germanism that position in the world which, by right, is its due.”^̂
In Our Future Bemhardi reiterated many of the same ideas he had presented in 
Germany and the Next War. He argued that “[njational policy stands in the most intimate 
relation with national civilization. It follows that national policy must be justified by 
aiming at serving the high purposes of civilization.”*̂® Again the idea of state power and 
expansion acquired a moral character, and again the German people, as “the most 
important promoters of modem civilization,”*®* were designated as the nation most able 
to lead the development of the human race. As in Germany and the Next War, Bemhardi 
traced Germany’s civilizing mission back to the Reformation, claiming that “[t]he fight 
between Germanism and the papacy was a battle for the free development of human 
civilization.”*®̂ Although he did not quote Treitschke nearly as extensively in this work, 
the resemblance to and the influence of the historian’s writings are evident. Indeed, 
Bemhardi turned to Treitschke to lend authority to his claims of Germany’s cultural role 
when he wrote, “Germany has enriched European civilization with new ideas and ideals.
^  F V. Bemhardi, Britain as Germany’s Vassal, 17. 
Ibid., 26-27.
Ibid., 32.
Ibid., 34.
104
and she is now occupying a place in the civilized world which cannot be filled by any 
other people.”*®̂
According to Bemhardi, Germany had to expand her political power. 
“Confidently relying upon German strength and German civilization,” he wrote in Our 
Future, “we Germans must try by all means in our power to acquire that political pre­
eminence which corresponds with our importance in the world.”^̂  ̂ He advocated 
German colonial expansion and the “[creation] everywhere [of] bases for the promotion 
of German civilization.”'*̂  ̂ German civilization should be promoted “in the interest of 
the world’s civilization.”'*'̂  As with Treitschke, the power of the state played a central 
role in Bemhardi’s political thought. He also revealed the centrality of the state in his 
conception of idealism: “To the idealist the State is a teacher of mankind.. .the State 
requires a constantly growing political power.” '*'̂
Finally, as the title of Barker’s translation made abundantly clear. Our Future 
revealed Bemhardi’s strongly anti-British attitudes. He portrayed England as the most 
formidable obstacle to Germany’s necessary expansion of political and economic 
influence. “England,” wrote Bemhardi, “opposes us throughout the world with hostility, 
and prevents us [from] acquiring colonies, the possession of which is for Germany a 
question of life or death.” '**̂ The members of the Triple Entente “strive to keep down 
Germany.”'*'̂  In order to permit Germany’s rise as a world power, “England must give
Treitschke quoted by F.v. Bemhardi, Britain as Germany’s Vassal, 50. 
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up her claim to a predominant position throughout the world.”'
In 1912, another of Bemhardi’s important works, On War o f  Today, appeared in 
German bookstores. A condensed version of Hugh Rees’s English translation was 
published in London in 1914 under the title How Germany Makes War}^^ As the original 
German title implies, its author likened himself to a modem Clausewitz. Daniel J.
Hughes has aptly described Bemhardi as “a self-styled successor to Clausewitz as 
Germany’s philosopher of war.”"^ Bemhardi agreed with Clausewitz’s famous maxim 
that war is “a continuation of policy by other means.”"^ Yet he differed with Clausewitz 
on one very fundamental point: “Clausewitz considers the defensive the stronger form of 
conducting war. 1 do not share this opinion.”" '' Bemhardi sought to demonstrate the 
changes in military strategy and theory necessitated by “three factors pressing a distinct 
stamp on war of to-day—the masses, the improved arms of defence and offence, and the 
modem means of communication.”"^ In short, Bemhardi attempted to reconcile the 
traditional techniques of warfare with the consequences of modemization.
On War o f  Today offered a critique of Sehlieffen’s conception of modem war, 
arguing that it was too “mechanistic.” “Conducting war under these conditions can 
scarcely be any longer called an art,” wrote Bemhardi. “It becomes a trade, and the 
commander is, as it were, a mechanic.”"^ As an altemative to Sehlieffen, Bemhardi 
presented what he called the “ingenious” theory of warfare. Whereas Sehlieffen’s
"“ Ibid., 82.
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“mechanistic” approach devised plans for battle before any evaluation of a particular 
battle’s eireumstanees, Bemhardi’s “ingenious” approaeb did not devise a plan of attaek 
until after a “due observation and assessment of the eireumstanees of the eonfliet.”*̂ ’
While mainly a theoretical work, Bemhardi’s prefaee to On War o f  Today did 
expose some of the above-mentioned political attitudes of its author. He did not even get 
beyond his first page before he mentioned the “neeessity” of a war—“on which the 
further development of our people depends”—in defense of Germany’s “most vital 
interest.” '̂ * As before, Bemhardi advoeated Germany’s colonial expansion and the 
buildup of her power in Central Europe, and he reminded his audienee that Germany was 
“a powerful, as well as a necessary, factor in the development of mankind.”  ̂ Finally, 
he wamed of the opposition of the English, a nation that “will most seriously resist any 
real extension of Germany’s power.” '̂  ̂ In a later chapter on naval waifare Bemhardi 
eautioned, “The English would surely not hesitate to seize the German eolonies in a war 
with Germany.”*̂* This prophecy of Bemhardi’s tumed out to be accurate.
Following the outbreak of World War 1 in 1914, British and Ameriean 
propagandists portrayed Bemhardi’s works as prime examples of the popular German 
mindset of the time. Paul Kennedy observes that by 1914 “[p]undits explained how the 
spirit of Treitsehke and Bemhardi had eonquered the German mind.”*̂  ̂ Books like 
Germany and the Next War and Our Future provided propaganda for German 
chauvinists—and support for allied propaganda against Germany. In 1915, Stanhope W.
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Sprigg wrote that “neutral peoples have [reaeted] with amazement and disgust [to] that 
revelation of the German soul.”’^̂
In response to such criticisms, Bemhardi published two pamphlets in 1915 in an 
attempt to answer his critics abroad. Both Germany and England and The New 
Bemhardi: “World Power or Downfall ” reveal an attempt to downplay the militaristic 
and imperialistic rhetoric of his earlier political works. In Germany and England, 
Bemhardi argued that American critics based their condemnations on “an absolutely 
erroneous understanding of what 1 have written.” '̂ "̂  He suggested that his books were 
being used in the United States “for the purpose of stirring up public opinion against 
Germany as the Power really responsible for the war.” *̂ ^
For better or for worse, Bemhardi’s efforts to bolster his image fell on mostly 
deaf ears. In his preface to The New Bernhardt, Sprigg maintained that “Bemhardi, 
obedient with Potsdam obedience, has taken his orders to eat his words for the sake of 
American opinion.”*̂  ̂ Sprigg’s critique was accurate. Although he sought to repair his 
image overseas, Bemhardi made no apologies and continued to espouse his nationalistic 
views. He continued to justify war by explaining, “1 have indeed proved, 1 think, that war 
is a neeessity in the life of nations.” ^̂  ̂ He retained his staunchly anti-British attitude: 
“everywhere the English have undertaken to limit our national development.”^̂ ^
Bemhardi also continued to express his debt to Treitsehke, confessing that “Treitsehke 
undoubtedly contributed to the promotion of German consciousness of herself and to the
Stanhope W. Sprigg’s preface to Bemhardi, The New Bernhardt: “World Power or Decline ’’ (London: 
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fostering of the longing for increased political power.” *̂  ̂ Bemhardi rejected, however, 
the claims of the British professor J.A. Cramb, who had vehemently criticized both 
Treitschke and Bemhardi for their chauvinistic views, that Treitschke had advocated 
German domination of the world. Overall, it was a poor attempt to mend his public 
image in Britain and the United States.
While Bemhardi’s ideas were unquestionably reckless, they should not be viewed 
as unique or peculiarly German. As early as December 1914 Carlton Hayes could 
correctly observe that “the popular misconceptions of Darwinism and the application of 
biological hypotheses on modem nationalism is lamentably not a peculiarity of 
Germans.”' H a y e s  pointed out the extreme enthusiasm in Britain for the royal navy and 
overseas empire. Furthermore, Britons widely accepted notions of the “manifest destiny 
of the Anglo-Saxon race” and Rudyard Kipling’s “white man’s burden.” Hayes criticized 
Cramb’s attacks on Bemhardi and Treitschke for ignoring “the parallel thought in Great 
Britain and France.” '^' Bemhardi had presented the German nation with the option of 
“world-power or downfall,” wrote Hayes. “For Great Britain, and for France too, patriots 
were soon to be found who would proclaim the same choice.” '̂ ^
In his valuable article on the “cult of the offensive,” Stephen van Evera examines 
the general European enthusiasm for offensive warfare in the years prior to 1914 He 
argues.
Militaries [across Europe] glorified the offensive and adopted offensive military 
doctrines, while civilian elites and publics assumed that the offense had the 
advantage in warfare, and that offensive solutions to security problems were the
Ibid., 41-42. 
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most effective.
In Germany, Bemhardi was joined by General Alfred von Sehlieffen, the mastermind of 
the infamous Sehlieffen Plan, and General Helmuth von Moltke. In Franee, enthusiasm 
for offensive warfare was an “obsession” that affeeted Freneh military men and eivilians 
alike. Van Evera eites the Freneh deputy Emile Durant, who in 1912 stated, “The idea of 
the offense must penetrate the spirit of our nation.” *̂"* In Britain, military strategists 
“resolutely rejeeted defensive strategies” and in Russia the Minister of War, General 
V.A. Sukhomlinov urged, “We must also follow this example [of the other powers].
Even the Belgians were swept away by enthusiasm for the offensive.
So, while Anglo-Saxon criticisms of Treitschke and Bemhardi that the two were 
indeed chauvinistic and imperialistic were certainly justified, their anti-German bias 
wholly discredits them. British and American publicists sensationalized the two 
Germans’ writings while blatantly ignoring the work of national and military enthusiasts 
in their own countries. The historian should not regard Bemhardi as a peculiarly German 
phenomenon. In fact, most European powers could lay claim to at least one or two 
“Bemhardis” prior to World War 1.
The fact that Bemhardi’s theories can be seen as part of a greater European trend 
should not, however, excuse his recklessness or the flaws in his arguments. In his 
Historians ’ Fallacies, Fischer exposes the main fault in Bemhardi’s method. By using 
Treitschke for scholarly authority, the general committed what Fischer has called the
Stephen van Evera, “The Cult o f the Offensive and the Origins o f the First World War,” Intemational 
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“fallacy of argument ad verecundiam," or “an appeal to authority.” *̂  ̂ One form of this 
type of fallacy is an “[appeal] to q u o ta t i o n s .B e m h a r d i ’s extensive references to 
Treitschke’s works did nothing to amass evidence in support of his arguments; quoting 
Treitschke simply reiterated points that Bemhardi had already made in his own words. 
Fischer would argue that Bemhardi’s points “cannot be sustained by attribution” to 
Treitschke. Rather, it was Bemhardi’s responsibility to “make an empirical case for 
them,” which he was not able to do.'^^
Fischer, 283.136
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Treitschke’s words were received with approval and enthusiasm by large sections 
of the German population in the closing years of the nineteenth century and the years 
leading up to World War I. “In many German homes,” one observer has written, “the 
family sat together in the evening to hear a chapter of the German History.”  ̂ Andreas 
Dorpalen asserts that Treitschke’s History “made its way into thousands of German 
homes,” where it was “[ajccepted as theology rather than as history.”  ̂ Peter Winzen 
agrees that Treitschke’s historical work had a great impact upon the German people:
The five volumes which appeared between 1879 and 1894 were usually quickly sold out 
and their contents often became the key talking points in Berlin salons and officers’ 
messes. Almost all the leading public figures o f  the Bismarck era as well as large 
sections o f the well-educated young people read Treitschke.^
Indeed, Treitschke’s work exerted such an influence on the popular mind of Germany
that Gordon Craig contends, “the serious student of German history can neglect
Treitschke’s writings only at the risk of losing an understanding of the psychological
factors that contributed to the fateful course of German polities before 1914.”'*
Many of Treitschke’s colleagues commended his efforts. Heinrich von Sybel and
his fellow editors at the Historische Zeitschrift issued complimentary reviews of
Treitschke’s History. In an 1886 review of Treitschke’s third volume of the German
History, G. Egelhaaf described the work as a “true pearl of the national literature” and
added, “Treitschke has shown us, and will show us yet more in the coming three
volumes, how the real foundations of the German state were gradually laid by the work of
* Ernst Leipprand, Heinrich von Treitschke im deutschen Geistesleben des 19. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: 
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Prussian statesmen.”^
Not all readers, however, expressed such sycophantic approval of Treitschke’s 
scholarship. Upon the publication of the second volume of the German History, 
Treitschke became embroiled in a protracted debate with the historian Hermann 
Baumgarten regarding the scholarly integrity of his work. In a pamphlet entitled 
“Treitschke’s Deutsche Geschichte,” Baumgarten chastised Sybel’s Historische 
Zeitschrift for its favorable review of the German History. He also attacked Treitschke, 
charging, “Treitschke’s entire book demonstrated a thoroughly unhistoric method of 
research.”  ̂ In his 1880 book about the Bismarckian era, Bruno Bauer branded Treitschke 
as a “worthy representative of a loud and arrogant chauvinism.”  ̂ In 1895 Theodor 
Mommsen issued an equally damning critique of Treitschke’s work: “[Treitschke] is for 
me the appropriate expression of the brutalization that places our civilization in 
question.”*
While Treitschke’s ideas received mixed reviews among the German academic 
community, they had a great and formative impact upon many of Wilhelmine Germany’s 
political elite. In an article entitled “Treitschke’s Influence on the Rise of Imperialist and 
Anti-British Nationalism in Germany,” Peter Winzen points out that Treitschke’s ideas 
influenced the policies and thought of men such as the Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow 
and the Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz. In his memoirs Bülow plainly stated that 
Treitschke’s German History “became the basis of [his] political way of thinking.”^
 ̂G. Egelhaaf, “Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert,” in Heinrich von Sybel (ed.), Historische 
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Tirpitz wrote in a similar vein in his own reminiscences, calling Treitschke the 
“wonderful man whose lectures I heard at the university from 1876 onwards and who 
also allowed me to seek his advice privately by scribbling my question on a scrap of 
paper.”’® Kaiser Wilhelm II recalled that out of all the highly esteemed scholars v/ho 
visited his home when he was a child, “Treitschke made the deepest impression on me.””
The work of Bemhardi provides a striking example of the importance of 
Treitschke’s thought among radical German nationalists prior to the First World War. 
Bemhardi could have had several possible motives for citing Treitschke as extensively as 
he did in his own works. First, Treitschke certainly had influenced the general’s 
intellectual evolution, perhaps to such an extent that Bemhardi wished to acknowledge 
this debt in his own publications. Second, even if  Treitschke’s influence on Bemliardi 
had been minimal, Bemhardi recognized the appeal that Treitsheke’s ideas had among 
the German public.
The most plausible conclusion is a combination of the two. The general 
undoubtedly received inspiration from the fiery Berlin professor, whom he acknowledged 
in his memoirs as a significant influence on his intellectual development. More than 
anything, though, Bemhardi relied on Treitschke to provide legitimacy for his own 
radical ideas. By including many of Treitschke’s most extreme statements in his own 
writings, Bemhardi provided his theories with “scientific” authority. In an age in which 
people grasped for a “key” to history,’  ̂Treitschke provided a historical interpretation 
that suggested that the rise and fall of nations provided the stimulus for all historieal 
change. If Bemhardi could support his claims with the statements of Treitschke, a
Alfred von Tirpitz quoted in Winzen, 163.
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renowned historian, they must have been legitimate, or would have at least appeared to be 
so. Andreas Dorpalen explains that many Germans commonly held the ideas presented 
by Treitschke at the time, hut “[sjtrengthening and deepening them, he endowed them 
with an aura of scholarly respectability which added to their attraction.” '  ̂ Treitschke’s 
history and the national mission it championed provided legitimacy for the radical ideas 
of German nationalists in the pre-war years.
As mentioned above, following the outbreak of World War I scholars in Britain 
and the United States, basing their conclusions in large part on the writings of Treitschke 
and Bemhardi, determined that Germany represented a tragic aberration in western 
civilization. This type of attitude regarding the alleged peculiarity of Germany and that 
country’s political, social, and economic development raises an important issue in 
German historiography, namely the extended and controversial debate surrounding the 
notion of a German Sonderweg, or “special path.” In their valuable book. The 
Peculiarities o f German History}^ David Blackboum and Geoff Eley clearly lay out the 
premises of the argument for a German Sonderweg. Essentially, in their attempts to 
explain German historical development, many historians have argued that unlike Britain, 
which had supposedly experienced a successful bourgeois revolution that entailed the 
construction of liberal parliamentary government, Germany’s bourgeoisie failed to assert 
itself in 1848 and then fell into a pattern of “ap[ing]” the aristocracy and its militaristic 
and authoritarian values.'^ Blackboum and Eley condemn such arguments, suggesting 
that they greatly oversimplify both German and British history, falsely treating all of
Dorpalen, Treitschke, 240-241.
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German history as the “ante-room of Nazism” and reducing British history to a formula.
Treitschke, a proponent of the 1848 Revolution who advocated state power and 
martial values with increasing vehemence after that revolution failed to create a liberal 
national state, would seem to be irrefutable evidence of a German Sonderweg, In fact, 
Treitschke was himself a Sonderweg theorist, but of a slightly different nature. 
Blackboum and Eley point out that while after World War 11 historians envisioned 
German history as uniquely negative, many historians (and others) before the war 
interpreted Germany’s political growth as uniquely positive:
after unification, there was a widespread tendency, especially among the academic and 
professional Bildungsbürgertum, to exalt the particular German combination o f political, 
economic, military, and educational institutions: monarchy and industrial success, 
university and army.'’
Such thinking defined Treitschke’s writing. Moreover, “Germany’s special superiority 
was very often defined vis-à-vis England,” '* another characteristic of Treitsehke’s 
thought.
So at first glance, a study of Treitschke might appear to reinforce notions of a 
German special path. When one looks beyond Treitschke and considers many of the 
cultural and political trends throughout Europe in the late nineteenth century, however, it 
becomes clear that a study of Treitschke does far more to refute notions of a German 
Sonderweg than it does to reinforce them. While the present study focuses on Treitschke 
and his impact in Germany, special care has been taken to demonstrate that he and 
Bemhardi had counterparts in other European countries. As discussed above, most 
European nations could boast of at least one or two national historians who presented
Ibid., 22. 
'’ Ibid., 3. 
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their nation as a chosen people or as a people possessing a special national mission. 
European states prior to World War I also had many military and civilian elites who 
heralded the values of imperialism and militarism as Bemhardi did in Germany. Thus, a 
study of Treitschke and Bemhardi should be seen as a case study and nothing more.
In the end, of course, the greatest flaw in Treitschke’s German mission was its 
exaggerated emphasis on state power, a criticism that can also appropriately be leveled 
against Bemhardi. “One also sees now,” writes Friedrich Meinecke,
how fatal it was for Treitschke himself to have restricted the essence o f the State 
to power alone. A more comprehensive idea o f  the State would have saved him 
from taking the exaggerated view that concem for its own power was ‘absolutely 
moral’ and took precedence, as a moral task, over all its other obligations.'®
Meinecke’s final indictment of Treitschke criticizes the historian’s “much too [lavish]”
use of the “predicate ‘moral.’” Ultimately, Treitschke’s careless and excessive use of the
adjective proved to be “clumsy and dangerous.”^̂  While Treitschke cannot be held
exclusively accountable for the extreme German chauvinism, imperialism, and militarism
of late Wilhelmine Germany, he indeed helped promote those sentiments and also
granted them a measure of scientific authority. “What he did,” commented one of his
listeners, “was to give, with his strong voice, expression and emphasis to the emotions of
the national soul and the enthusiasms of our young people; he made the latter fully aware
of their own feelings.” *̂
Meinecke, 407.
Ibid., 408.
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